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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS:
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVACY

GRAYSON BARBER*

INTRODUCTION
Governmental agencies, including the courts, have a special obligation to
protect the public’s interest in individual privacy. Government records and
court records are being harvested for personal information about individuals,
contributing to a surge in identity theft, consumer profiling, and the
development of a stratified society where individuals are pigeonholed
according to the electronic trail they leave of transactions that disclose personal
details about them. Personal information is valuable to commercial interests,
but the state has no obligation to disclose data about its citizens. To the
contrary, the government should protect individuals who disclose information
about themselves to the state only because they are forced to do so.
All governments collect and use personal information in order to govern. 1
Government records include data that contain personal information about
* Grayson Barber, a First Amendment litigator and privacy advocate in Princeton, New Jersey,
wishes to thank those whose insights and essential support have contributed to the work presented
here: Peter D. Meyers, Frank Askin, Ed Barocas, Thomas J. Cafferty, Fred Cate, Frank Corrado,
Chris Hoofnagle, Stuart Kaplan, William John Kearns, Jr., Helen Nissenbaum, Daniel Solove, Jay
Stanley, and Barry Steinhardt.
1. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002) (giving an excellent analysis of government records
and the perils of aggregating individual information).
States maintain records spanning an individual’s life from birth to death, including
records of births, marriages, divorces, professional licenses, voting information, worker’s
compensation, personnel files (for public employees), property ownership, arrests, victims
of crime, criminal and civil court proceedings, and scores of other [pieces of]
information. . . .. These records contain personal information including a person’s
physical description (age, photograph, height, weight, eye color); race, nationality, and
gender; family life (children, marital history, divorces, and even intimate details about
one’s marital relationship); residence, location, and contact information (address,
telephone number, value and type of property owned, description of one’s home); political
activity (political party affiliation, contributions to political groups, frequency of voting);
financial condition (bankruptcies, financial information, salary, debts); employment
(place of employment, job position, salary, sick leave); criminal history (arrests,
convictions, traffic citations); health and medical condition (doctors’ reports,
63
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individuals. Many of these records have long been open for public inspection
for a number of reasons. Government offices, including the courts, must
moderate their need to collect information with their obligations to be open to
the people and simultaneously to protect the privacy of individuals.
Every individual in this country is compelled to disclose personal
information to the government. One has no choice. 2 In order to receive
government services, in order to do business with the government, and in order
to be a law-abiding citizen, one must provide one’s home address, telephone
number (listed or unlisted), and much more to the government. The
government, therefore, must protect the public interest by maintaining the
privacy of personal information in government files. 3 No commercial entity is
likely to do so, and individuals rarely have the power to protect their personal
privacy from commercial pressures to treat personal data as a commodity. 4
The core purpose of open government records statutes is to enhance public
understanding of the operations and activities of government. 5
Official information that sheds light on a state agency’s performance of its
statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose,
however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that
is accumulated in various governmental files but reveals little or nothing about
an agency’s own conduct. 6

The government collects a great deal of information about its citizens that,
if re-disclosed and assembled in a new mosaic, could be exploited to the
detriment of individual privacy. States require their citizens to disclose data
about their personal affairs, including Social Security numbers, medical
information, financial information and home addresses. 7 The government may
well have important reasons for collecting such information, but, as noted by
the U.S. Supreme Court, “[t]he right to collect and use such data for public
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory

psychiatrists’ notes, drug prescriptions, diseases and other disorders); and identifying
information (mother’s maiden name, Social Security number). This list is far from
complete.
Id. at 1139.
2. Basic family relationships, for example, such as marriage and divorce, involve obtaining
licenses and decrees from the executive and judicial branches respectively. Cf. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (fundamental constitutional right to marry).
3. See Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the public interest in privacy, especially in the home, was sufficient to defeat a First
Amendment challenge to the “Do-Not-Call” list).
4. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995).
5. U.S. Dep’t. of Def. v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994).
6. Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted).
7. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
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duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. . . . . In some circumstances that
duty . . . has roots in the Constitution . . . .” 8
The availability of personal information in government records is exploited
for commercial and sometimes criminal purposes.
Commercial data
aggregators routinely mine government records to gather information about
individuals. 9 This practice in turn has been exploited for fraudulent purposes.
In February 2005, for example, the country’s largest information broker,
ChoicePoint, unwittingly sold personal information on at least 145,000
Americans to a criminal ring engaged in identity theft. 10 ChoicePoint sent
letters to residents of California, notifying them of the wrongful disclosure of
their personal information, but only because California had a state law on the
books forcing ChoicePoint to take the action. 11 In response to a letter from
thirty-eight state attorney generals, ChoicePoint sent out letters to other
potential victims of identity theft across the country, but it did not disclose to
the victims the data it disclosed to the thieves. 12 ChoicePoint obtains much of
its data from government files. 13

8. Id.
9. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Access Denied: The Data Industry May Face New Restriction
after Privacy Breaches, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), May 20, 2005, at 17.
10. Evan Perez & Rich Brooks, File Sharing: For Big Vendor of Personal Data, A Theft
Lays Bare the Downside, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2005, at A1. See also Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches Reported Since the ChoicePoint Incident,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (listing a
chronology of data breaches, which demonstrates that many databases collect and store sensitive
personal information with inadequate security, including banks, schools, retailers and government
offices); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Data Security: The Discussion Draft of Data Protection
Legislation, Testimony & Stmt. for the Record before the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection (Jul. 29, 2005), available
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/datasec7.28.05.html (discussing some of the motives
for security breaches, including identity theft, debt collection, extortion, voyeurism, and
competition).
11. After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by
ChoicePoint and other Data Aggregators?: Hearing on S.B. 550 Before the Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Insurance, Cal. Senate, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 30, 2005) (testimony of Dan
McGuffey, Vice President, Data Acquisition and Strategy, ChoicePoint Services, Inc.), available
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cp3.30.05.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). The title
of
the
hearing
can
be
found
at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_05010550/sb_550_cfa_20050504_153527_sen_comm.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
12. 38 AGs Send Open Letter to ChoicePoint, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/infotheft/2005-02-19-ag-letter-tochoicepoint_x.htm.
13. After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by
ChoicePoint and other Data Aggregators?: Hearing on S.B. 550 Before the Comm. On Banking,
Finance and Insurance, Cal. Senate, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 30, 2005) (testimony of Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at http://72.14.203.104/
search?q=cache:irwkp5EPpBoJ:www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
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Reed Elsevier, the Anglo-Dutch publishing giant, similarly reported in
April 2005 that unauthorized people using customer passwords of its
subsidiary, Seisint, may have gained access to the personal information of up
to 310,000 people in the United States. 14 Seisint and Lexis-Nexis (Reed
Elsevier’s legal department) often obtain data from government records. 15
Since the ChoicePoint breach was first reported, scores of similar breaches
have been reported, affecting the personal information of millions of
individuals. 16 These breaches reflect a failure of self-regulation on the part of
the commercial entities that collect, store, and sell personal information.
A recent report described the ease with which government records may be
combined to create dossiers on citizens. 17 Computer scientists at Johns
Hopkins University replicated the methods of companies like ChoicePoint by
linking databases such as death records, property tax information, campaign
donations, and occupational license registries. 18 For less than $50 it was
possible to enter a single name and generate multiple layers of information on
individuals, including home address, phone number, occupation, birth dates,
and family details. 19
The question arises, therefore, as to whether the government should take
steps to withhold sensitive personal information from disclosure on the
Internet. The companies that turn a profit from collecting and then selling such
The title of the hearing can be found at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_550
_cfa_20050504_153527_sen_comm.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
14. Kirchgaessner, supra note 9, at 17.
[T]he Financial Times obtained a comprehensive report on one individual generated by
Seisint’s Accurint database. It included the person’s Social Security number[,] . . . . . .
political party affiliation, date of birth, every address at which the person had lived within
the U.S., the names and birth dates of some neighbours . . . . . . and details of a property
sale. . . .
The report also included the names, previous and current addresses and telephone
numbers of the individual’s immediate family members; the first five digits of the family
members’ Social Security numbers; the names and birthdates of their neighbours; and
“neighbourhood profiles” - the average age of residents in the neighbourhood, the average
number of years of education, the median household income and the median home value.
Accurint also offered information on whether the individual had any registered motor
vehicles or merchant vessels; whether they were certified by the Federal Aviation
Administration; whether they had a criminal record or had committed any sexual
offences; or whether they owned a hunting or fishing permit or a permit to hold a
concealed weapon.
Id.
15. Heather Timmons, Reed Elsevier Raises Toll for Data Theft at LexisNexis Unit,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 14, 2005, at 16, available at http:www.westlaw.com.
16. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 10.
17. Tom Zeller, Jr., Personal Data for the Taking: Students Surfing Public Records Learn
It’s Easy to Find Out a Lot, NEW YORK TIMES, May 18, 2005, at A1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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information, often through open government records requests, have lobbied
forcefully to ensure that public sources of private information remain open. 20
This article, by contrast, makes the case that state actors have an obligation to
protect confidential personal information from unwarranted disclosure.
Part I of this article describes the kinds of personal information collected,
stored, and disclosed by government offices, including the courts, and
describes the principles of fair information practices that should be brought to
bear upon the release of personal information to commercial data brokers. Part
II explicates the tensions between privacy and disclosure, using the specific
examples of home address information and a heated debate before a state
privacy study commission in New Jersey. Part III asks whether a “right to
information privacy” can survive in the digital age, examining the
constitutional, statutory, and normative arguments for and against disclosure of
personal information in government files. Part IV discusses the eroding
distinction between government and commercial databases and implications
for civil liberties. Part V offers policy recommendations to protect public
interest in privacy.
I. PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS
To withstand the profit imperative, individuals in the United States are
protected by a patchwork of narrow privacy statutes. One’s video rental
records, for example, are amply protected by federal law, 21 but one’s health
records may be disclosed for marketing purposes. 22 The privacy interests of a
single individual are rarely strong enough to prevail against countervailing
commercial interests, but most Americans sense they are entitled to a measure

20. The leading advocate for keeping public records open to data mining companies is the
Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access (“CSPRA”). Members of CSPRA include Acxiom
Corporation, Donnelly Marketing, The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Equifax Inc., Experian,
First American Real Estate Solutions, Lexis Nexis, The Polk Company, and Trans Union. Fred
H. Cate & Richard J. Varn, The Public Record, Information Privacy and Access: A New
Framework for Finding the Balance, http://www.netcaucus.org/books/privacy2001/pdf/
Limitsofoptin.pdf. Ironically, CSPRA appears to have taken down its website, at least
temporarily (www.cspra.org/csprasite/). Some of its activities are described in a white paper at
http://www.netcaucus.org/books/privacy2001/pdf/Limitsofoptin.pdf.
For more information on lobbying efforts by the Newspaper Association of America, the
Society of Professional Journalists, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the
Associated Press, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, see Jonathan Kaplan, The
Freedom of Information Center: Advocates for Journalists May Take Agenda to K Street, THE
HILL, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://foi.missouri.edu/firstamendment/advforjs.html. See also
Tom Zeller, Jr., The Scramble to Protect Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9, 2005, at C1.
21. Video Protection Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
22. See HIPAA Privacy Act, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500(a), 164.501 (defining marketing),
164.508(a)(3), 164.512(b)(1)(iii)(D) (2005).
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of privacy that goes above and beyond the claims that are recognized by tort
law. 23
A.

Open Government Records Statutes

Open government records are essential for a functioning democracy,
allowing citizens to understand and evaluate the inner workings of state and
local government. Open government records are also a valuable tool for
protecting individuals from governmental intrusion into personal privacy.
Privacy advocates often use the Freedom of Information Act and other open
government records statutes to limit governmental intrusion into the private
lives of individuals. 24

23. The tort of invasion of privacy was first proposed by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel
D.Warren in The Right to Privacy, 4 HARVARD L. REV. 193 (1890). This tort differs substantially
in its origins from the line of cases following the constitutional right to information privacy and
FOIA-type statutes. See, e.g., Kinsella v. Welch, 827 A.2d 325, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2003) (“A crucial distinction between the constitutional right of privacy and its common law
namesake is that the common law right operates as a control on private behavior, while the
constitutional right operates as a control on government. The two rights are necessarily different
because our concept of appropriate behavior for private persons and government officials is
different.”). Open government records statutes apply to state action, and the tort applies to
commercial or other non-governmental actors. See generally Understanding the Federal Courts:
The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
1999, at 7-10, http://www.uscourts.gov/UFC99.pdf; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980). Legally
recognized privacy interests have been aptly described as a haystack in a hurricane; examples of
privacy invasions abound, yet they often defy systematic labeling. Ettore v. Philco Television
Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956). The Second Restatement of Torts adopted
Prosser’s classic system of categorizing four different kinds of privacy invasions: 1) intrusion
(e.g., hidden videotape cameras); 2) appropriation (e.g., commercial use of name or likeness); 3)
false light (from which spring, for example, disclaimers on motion pictures, denying any
resemblance to persons living or dead); and 4) public disclosure of private facts (e.g., disclosing
privileged communications). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). This system of
categorization has operated as both a blessing and a curse. The categories have allowed litigants
to recover for some kinds of invasions, but have seriously limited those who fall outside the
parameters of the four compartments. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ginsberg, 351 F.3d 473, 479-81
(11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to extend the invasion of privacy to include unwelcome touching in a
sexual manner).
24. See Solove, supra note 1. Personal information, including home addresses and telephone
numbers, may be obtained from state government records without using open government records
statutes as the avenue for submitting the request. Id. at 1143-45. The courts remain another
avenue for obtaining non-public government records. Id. at 1156 . A common law right exists in
most states to inspect government records so long as the requestor has a good reason to inspect
the records, and the requestor’s reasons for inspecting the records outweigh the state’s interest in
confidentiality. Id. A substantial body of case law generally provides broader access to
government records, but requires a judicial balancing test. In many jurisdictions, however, the
common law right of access to government records permits the state to inquire into the
requestor’s reasons for seeking governmental records. Id. at 1158.
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Federal offices are governed by two companion statutes: the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), and the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”), both
of which pertain to the disclosure of information about individual citizens. 25
The presumption behind FOIA is that government records belong to the people
and should be disclosed unless they fall within one of nine specific
categories. 26 The Privacy Act creates a presumption that if a government
record pertains to an individual citizen, it should not be disclosed unless certain
specific exceptions apply. 27
As discussed in the New Jersey Privacy Study Commission Report, 28 when
Congress considered these measures in the early 1970s, the United States
Privacy Protection Study Commission articulated a set of fair information
practices to limit the government’s use of personally identifiable information. 29
These principles provide guidelines to limit the collection, use, disclosure,
retention, and disposal of personal information by the government, and they
have become widely accepted. 30 The following principles of fair information
practices have become the foundation for many privacy laws and codes of
practice around the world:
Collection limitation. There should be limits to the collection of personal
data. Any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where
appropriate, with the knowledge and consent of the data subject.
Data Quality. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which
the data are gathered and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be
accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date.
Purpose Specification. The purposes for which personal data are collected
should be specified no later than the time of data collection, and the subsequent
use should be limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are
not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of
change of purpose.

25. The Freedom of Information Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C § 552 (2002); The Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2004).
26. The exemptions are for (1) national security; (2) internal agency rules; (3) other statutes;
(4) business information; (5) internal government memos; (6) private matters; (7) law
enforcement investigations; (8) regulation of financial institutions; and (9) oil wells. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
28. See SPECIAL DIRECTIVE SUBCOMM., N.J. PRIVACY STUDY COMM’N, DRAFT OF THE
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL DIRECTIVE SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE NEW JERSEY PRIVACY STUDY
COMMISSION 17 (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.nj.gov/privacy/eo26.pdf.
29. See PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: REPORT OF THE PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report.
30. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (permissible purposes of
consumer reports); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (fair information practices for
personally identifiable information).
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Use Limitation. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available, or
otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with the
purpose specification principle except with the consent of the data subject or
by the authority of law.
Security Safeguards. Personal data should be protected by reasonable
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure of data.
Openness. There should be a general policy of openness about
developments, practices, and policies with respect to personal data. Means
should be readily available for establishing the existence and nature of personal
data and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual
residence of the data custodian.
Individual Participation. An individual should have the right:
(a) to obtain from a data custodian confirmation of whether or not the data
custodian has data relating to him;
(b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him (i) within a
reasonable time; (ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; (iii) in a
reasonable manner; and (iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to him;
(c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is
denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and
(d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to
have the data erased, rectified, completed, or amended.
Accountability. A data custodian should be accountable for complying
with measures that give effect to the principles stated above. 31
The United States Privacy Protection Study Commission recognized that
“[t]he real danger is the gradual erosion of individual liberties through the
automation, integration and interconnection of many small, separate recordkeeping systems, each of which alone may seem innocuous, even benevolent,
and wholly justifiable.” 32 The Internet has realized this prediction. Indeed,
credit card companies, financial institutions, and government agencies share or

31. New Jersey Information Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-1 (1985) (governs
HMOs and other insurance entities); Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21 (1985). Every state in
the European Union has adopted fair information practices as law. See Council Directive
95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), 31-51 (EC) (Directive of the European Parliament and the Council
of Ministers of the European Commission on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data); THE ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html.
32. U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY Ch. 13 (1977), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/
c13.htm.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS

71

sell personal information unless the affected individuals take affirmative steps
to demand that their records not be disclosed. 33
As presently constituted, many state open government records statutes
threaten to expose individual citizens to greater invasions of privacy, not by
government, but by commercial enterprise. 34 Many requests for government
records come not from watchdog groups, the press, or private citizens, but
from data mining companies that glean personal information from
governmental records for the purpose of creating “profiles” or dossiers on
individuals. 35
B.

Court Records

Courthouse records, similarly, are mined and harvested for personally
identifiable information. Court records often contain information that is
exquisitely personal, such as:
- Social Security numbers;
- income and business tax returns;
- information provided or exchanged by the parties in child support
enforcement actions;
- home addresses of litigants, witnesses and jurors;
- photographs depicting violence, death, or children subjected to abuse;
- name, address, or telephone number of victims, including sexual assault
and domestic violence cases;
- names, addresses, and telephone numbers of witnesses in criminal
cases;
- names, addresses ,and telephone numbers of informants in criminal
cases;
- names, addresses, or telephone numbers of potential or sworn jurors in
criminal cases;
- juror questionnaires and transcripts of voir dire of prospective jurors;
- medical or mental health records, including examination, diagnosis,
evaluation, or treatment records;

33. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Pub.L. No. 106-102, 15 USC, Subchapter I, Sec. 6801-6809
(1999) (financial institutions may sell or disclose personal financial records unless the individual
“opts-out”). See http://www.zabasearch.com for an example of a website that obtains unlisted
telephone numbers from government records and makes them freely available online.
34. Different states vary considerably in their approaches to providing access to government
records. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1163.
35. The federal Government Accountability Office defines “data mining” as “the application
of database technology and techniques – such as statistical analysis and modeling – to uncover
hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of
future results.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A
WIDE RANGE OF USES 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf.
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- psychological evaluations of parties, for example regarding competency
to stand trial;
- child custody evaluations in family law or abuse and neglect actions;
- information related to the performance, conduct, or discipline of
judicial officers;
- information related to alleged misconduct by entities or individuals
licensed or regulated by the judiciary;
- trade secrets and other intellectual property. 36
The personal information taken from government records is often not used
for its intended purpose but instead purchased and sold for purposes totally
unrelated to government mandates. 37 Citizens are compelled to disclose
information about themselves to the courts, but their information may be
mined and sold for a profit. 38 Nor is the information used for purposes that
benefit the individual.
These court records can be used to create an underclass of people who
cannot get jobs, rent apartments, or obtain credit. For example, data mining
companies that perform employee background checks keep permanent records
of arrests and criminal sentences. 39 Once recorded in commercial databases,
these records cannot be corrected or expunged, even if the arrests never led to
conviction or if the data become stale and irrelevant. 40 Currently, AfricanAmericans are disproportionately represented in the vulnerable population of
people who have such records. 41
The courts and state and local government agencies must not disregard the
consequences of publishing these records. State actors have no obligation to
help data mining companies make a profit. However, state and local
government agencies do have an obligation to protect the public interest in
privacy. This can be done without compromising the spirit and purpose of
open government records legislation, which is to shed light on government
operations.
36. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1145-48.
37. Id. at 1194-95.
38. See id. at 1145, 1149-50, 1152.
39. See, e.g., Jennifer Bayot, Use of Credit Records Grows in Screening Job Applicants,
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2004. See also, Solove, supra note 1, at 1152 (explaining that an
anonymous woman was terminated from her job after a background check erroneously indicated a
past drug conviction).
40. Congress has elicited comments on the Attorney General’s report on Criminal Records
and Employment Screening (OLP Docket No. 100). See Government in the Sunshine Act
Meeting Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,849 (June 6, 2005); Groups Warn of Privacy Risks in
Employment Screening, August 8, 2005, available at www.privacyrights.org/ar/DOJbackgrd.htm.
See also Kim Zetter, Bad Data Fouls Background Checks, WIRED, March 11, 2005,
www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66856,00.html.
41. See EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES AND CREDIT REPORTS: HOW THE SYSTEM
REALLY WORKS WHAT YOU CAN DO 235 (2004).
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II. THE STATE HAS AN OBLIGATION TO PROTECT CITIZENS
Confidence in government at all levels is best sustained by access to the
information necessary to promote the vigorous public discussion that a wellfunctioning democracy requires. However, when dealing with information that
individuals reasonably expect to remain private and to not be published by the
government, there should be a presumption that such information will remain
confidential unless there is an overriding justification for its disclosure.
To that end, the state should confer special protection for four categories of
information: home address, Social Security Number, medical information and
financial information. 42 The privacy value of the Social Security Number is
well known, 43 and there is widespread support for keeping medical and
financial records confidential. 44 To illustrate the tension between privacy and
disclosure and to explicate the constitutional and statutory limits on publication
by the government, one highly controversial data item provokes heated debate:
the home address. 45
Home address information is avidly sought by commercial data
aggregators and avidly protected by a comparatively small population of
individuals who seek confidentiality and sometimes protection. 46 The
government’s obligation to protect or disclose home address information is
subject to constitutional, statutory, common law, and normative limits.
A.

Home Address Information

Home addresses poignantly illustrate the debate about whether state
agencies should disclose personal information about citizens pursuant to open

42. See infra p. 27 and nn. 320 & 330 for the proposition that two exceptions should apply to
home address: voter registration records and tax assessment records should remain public,
whereas all other home address records should remain confidential. See infra nn. 328-31 and
accompanying text for the proposition that one exception should apply as to financial records: the
salaries of public employees.
43. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: PRIVATE SECTOR
ENTITIES ROUTINELY OBTAIN AND USE SSNS, AND LAWS LIMIT THE DISCLOSURE OF THIS
INFORMATION, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0411.pdf.
44. See U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977), available at http:/ www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report.
45. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (rejecting argument
that vendors have a right under the Constitution to send unsolicited mail into another’s home);
Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that plaintiffs argued that the
law infringed their constitutionally protected privacy interest by disseminating their home
address).
46. See, e.g., National Network to End Domestic Violence, Public & Internet Access to
Court Records: Safety & Privacy Risks for Victims of Domestic Violence & All Citizens Using the
Justice System, available at www.ischool.washington.edu/lawsymposium/docs/CourtRecordsand
Victims.pdf; Solove, supra note 1, at 1138-40.
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government records requests. On one side, data aggregators and journalists
argue that home address is a valuable identifier that should always be in the
public domain. 47 On the other, privacy advocates and many individuals argue
that the state should not be in the business of disclosing personally identifiable
information. 48
Citizens disclose their home addresses because they are compelled to do so
by state law and in order to receive basic governmental services. 49 Since they
have no choice but to give their home addresses to the government, they
should reasonably expect that the government will not re-disclose their
addresses to unknown third parties. As explained below, there exists a right to
privacy in one’s home address, under the United States Constitution, some
state constitutions, and by statute. 50
i. Special Status of the Home. “The home has long enjoyed significant
legal protection as a private place.” 51 The maxim that “a man’s home is his
castle” appeared as early as 1499. 52 Parliamentarian William Pitt wrote, “The
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter – all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!” 53 The Supreme Court
recognized in 1886 the importance of protecting “the sanctity of a man’s
home.” 54 “In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s
home . . . .” 55
The home enjoys a special status as refuge from intrusions by the state and
commercial enterprise. 56 One of the most famous formulations of the right to
47. Compare Solove, supra note 1, at 1149, with Fred H. Cate & Richard J. Varn, The Public
Record, Information Privacy and Access: A New Framework for Finding the Balance,
http://it.ojp.gov/initiatives/files/Public_Record.pdf.
48. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FROM SSN USE, BUT COULD PROVIDE
BETTER SAFEGUARDS, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/d02352.pdf.
49. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1143-44.
50. See infra Part I.A.i-iii.
51. MARC ROTENBERG & DANIEL J. SOLOVE, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 585 (2003).
52. Id.
53. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 & n.7 (1958) (quoting William Pitt’s
speech before Parliament in 1763).
54. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
55. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
56. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (rejecting the
argument that a vendor has a Constitutional right to send unwanted material into the home of
another); Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that governmental interest is sufficient to defeat First Amendment challenge to “do-not-call”
registry); F.L.R.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that the
disclosure of an individual’s home address infringes upon a recognized privacy interest);
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privacy calls it “the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.” 57 In Rowan v. United States Post
Office, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “right to be let alone” in one’s
home requires upholding, against First Amendment challenges, the rights of
homeowners to take their names and addresses off various mailing lists:
We . . . categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of
another. . . . That we are often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be
captives everywhere. . . . The asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the
outer boundary of every person’s domain.” 58

Rowan places the right to be let alone in one’s home “in the scales” with
the constitutionally protected rights of others to communicate. 59
ii. Federal Constitutional Protection for Home Address Information. The
United States Constitution explicitly protects the home as a refuge from
governmental action, including dissemination of personal information. The
Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects . . .[,]” 60 the Third Amendment protects the
home from military use, 61 and the First Amendment protects free expression in
the home. 62 The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically protects private conduct in the home. 63
The United States Supreme Court defined a distinct constitutional right to
“information privacy” in Whalen v. Roe, which addressed the constitutionality
of a state law that required physicians to report patients who obtained certain
kinds of prescription drugs. 64 The Court held that the right to privacy
embraced both (i) an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters” and (ii) an “interest in independence in making certain kinds of

F.L.R.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that federal
employees have privacy interests in their home addresses); N.A.R.F.E. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873,
879 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding there was no public interest in the disclosure of addresses of
individuals receiving federal employee retirement benefits).
57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
58. 397 U.S. at 738 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 736.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
62. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
63. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003). Many Supreme Court
cases make the point in a variety of contexts that the home is the last refuge of privacy. See, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-31 (2001) (thermal imaging); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 483-85 (1988) (residential picketing); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978)
(broadcast media).
64. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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important decisions.” 65 Interpreting this right to information privacy, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that case law
“reflect[s] the general understanding that home addresses are entitled to some
privacy protection, whether or not so required by a statute.” 66
iii. Statutory Protection for Home Address Information: FOIA and the
Privacy Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, there exists a substantial
privacy interest in home address information. 67 This interest is expressed, in
part, through legislation, of which the best current example is the Privacy Act,
which Congress enacted as a companion statute to the FOIA. 68
The FOIA was enacted in 1966 and amended in 1974. 69 FOIA creates
procedures whereby any member of the public may obtain records of the
agencies of the federal government. 70 It has served as the model for most open
government records statutes in the states. 71
Although the goal of FOIA is full disclosure of government records,
Congress concluded that some confidentiality would be necessary for the
government to function. 72 A federal agency may refuse to release certain types
of information. 73 There are nine legal categories that are exempted from FOIA
under section 552(b) of the law. 74 One of the exemptions is for “private
matters;” 75 another is for other statutes, including the Privacy Act. 76
The Privacy Act permits individuals to obtain their own records, gives
them the right to correct, amend, or delete information about themselves, and
gives them the right to sue federal agencies if they refuse to correct or amend
the records. 77 The Privacy Act creates a default presumption that records
regarding personal individuals will not be disclosed. 78
Reading FOIA and the Privacy Act together, the U.S. Supreme Court has
said that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to their

65. Id. at 599-600, 604-05.
66. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999).
67. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994) (interpreting the Freedom of
Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974).
68. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2005).
69. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2005).
70. § 552(a)(1).
71. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1161.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
73. § 552(b).
74. For a list of the nine exceptions, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
75. § 552(b)(6).
76. § 552(b)(3).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2005). This is consistent with the principles of fair information
practices. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2005).
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home addresses. 79 In United States Department of Defense v. Fair Labor
Relations Authority, the Court explained:
It is true that home addresses often are publicly available through sources such
as telephone directories and voter registration lists, but in an organized society,
there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. . . .
. . . .An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information
regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information
may be available to the public in some form. . . . . . . . . We are reluctant to
disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special consideration in
our Constitution, laws, and traditions. 80

This is consistent with ordinary experience. Many people have a
reasonable expectation that their home addresses will be private. These
include children and people who have made a genuine effort to keep their
home address information private by getting an unlisted telephone number or
asking to be removed from mailing lists. Other groups of people often seek
protection of their home address information: celebrities, domestic violence
victims, stalking victims, witnesses in criminal cases, abortion doctors, and
police officers.
If one does not want one’s residence to be known, the importance of its
being unknown goes to the core of individual privacy. People who do not want
the government to disclose their home addresses have limited means for
preventing disclosure and little recourse once the disclosure has been made.
The government should not force individuals to sacrifice their privacy as a
condition of doing business. 81 Indeed, if a state were routinely to give out
home addresses, it would be at peril not only of violating the Constitution, but
it would also repudiate the privacy protections of the federal FOIA approach,
which is the approach on which most state open government records statutes
are modeled. 82
In Forest Guardians v. U.S. FEMA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed privacy for
geographic information systems (“GIS”), finding that disclosure would invade
privacy by giving away the location of residential structures in New Mexico’s
flood plains. 83 The court found there was no public interest in disclosure. 84

79. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994).
80. Id. at 500-01 (citations and quotations omitted).
81. Some states allow victims of domestic violence to use an alternate address for all state
and local governmental purposes, including driver’s licenses and registration, professional
licensing, banking and insurance records, welfare, etc. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:4-1
(1998). New Jersey laws also enable victims of domestic violence to vote without revealing their
addresses. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-3.2 (2001). Victims of sexual assault and stalking may use
an alternate address on their driver’s license and registration. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-4 (2004).
82. See, e.g., McClain v. Coll. Hospital, 492 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 1985).
83. 410 F.3d 1214, 1216-19 (10th Cir. 2005).
84. Id. at 1219.
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The Forest Guardians, an environmental group, asked for the information
in order to show that FEMA was promoting overdevelopment in flood plains. 85
FEMA released the information in paper form, but declined to disclose its GIS
files. 86 The court held that “[i]n the context of an individual residence, ‘the
privacy interest of an individual in avoiding the unlimited disclosure of his or
her name and address is significant. . . . . . . . .” 87
The type of privacy interests Congress intended to protect under Exemption 6
[of FOIA] encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or
her person. Such private information includes, for example, an individual’s
name and home address. The privacy interest in an individual’s home address
becomes even more substantial when that information would be coupled with
personal financial information. In this case, the electronic GIS files are exempt
from disclosure under Exemption 6 . . . [as they] reveal specific geographic
point locations for NFIP [“National Flood Insurance Program”] insured
structures. Such information, coupled with property records, can lead to,
among other things, the names and addresses of individual property owners
and thus applies to particular individuals. 88

The court found commercial solicitation to be sufficiently intrusive to invoke
governmental protection. 89
NFIP policyholders have a privacy interest – the extent of which we need not
quantify today. . . . . . . . . Furthermore, disclosure of the electronic GIS files
and, the concomitant disclosure of personal information, could subject
individuals to unwanted contacts or solicitation by private insurance
companies. Given the commercial interests involved in the NFIP and, the
large-scale participation by the private insurance industry, a palpable threat
exists that disclosing information that could reveal names, home addresses, and
other personal insurance policy information could lead to an influx of
unwanted and unsolicited mail, if not more. 90

B.

One Local Debate: The New Jersey Privacy Study Commission

Debating authorities and interest groups engaged in vigorous dispute over
access to home address information before a state commission in New Jersey.
The New Jersey Privacy Study Commission 91 was convened for the purpose of

85. Id. at 1216.
86. Id. at 1217.
87. Id. at 1220 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 35 (D.C. Cir.
2002)).
88. Forest Guardians, 410 F.3d at 1218 (citations and quotations omitted).
89. Id. at 1221.
90. Id. at 1220-21 (citations omitted).
91. The New Jersey Privacy Study Commission, on which the author served, was ably
staffed by Catherine Starghill and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs. State of
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exploring the impact of the state’s new open government records statute, the
Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”). 92 New Jersey had gone from having one
of the most restrictive FOIA-type statutes, to having one of the most open. 93
Under a special directive from the governor, the Privacy Study Commission
grappled specifically with the issue of home addresses, generating considerable
controversy. 94 Over the course of a year and a half, the Privacy Study
Commission elicited testimony from scores of witnesses, who argued for and
against the disclosure of home address information from state and local
government files. 95
i. Arguments Against Disclosure of Home Address Information. The most
common argument against disclosing home address and telephone information
is “When I give my home address to the government I don’t want the
government to give it to anyone else.” 96 The National Network to End
Domestic Violence, for example, criticized the practice of publishing domestic
violence, sexual assault, and family law cases on the Internet. 97 The New
Jersey Coalition for Battered Women submitted a written statement strongly
opposing the disclosure of names, addresses, phone numbers, and personal
information to the general public. 98 “No victim of domestic violence should be
impeded in her or his efforts to remain safe from a batterer by the unmonitored
disclosure of their contact information by the government.” 99
An expert on privacy and government records, Professor Daniel J.
Solove, 100 provided written testimony to the Commission, taking the position
that governmental disclosure of home address information might in some
instances violate the federal or state constitution. 101 To disclose home
New Jersey Privacy Study Commission, Commission Members and Staff, http://www.nj.gov/
privacy/members.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
92. State of New Jersey Privacy Study Commission, http://www.nj.gov/privacy (last visited
Nov. 7, 2005). For the full text of the Open Public Records Act, including the charge to the
Privacy Study Commission, see Open Public Records Act, http://www.state.nj.us/grc/act.html.
93. See 1963 N.J. Laws 223; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 (2005).
94. Exec. Order No. 26, State of New Jersey, Aug. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom26.shtml.
95. N.J. PRIVACY STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: N.J. PRIVACY COMMISSION 15
(Dec. 2004), available at http://www.nj.gov/privacy/prc_final_report_v21.pdf (last visited Nov.
18, 2005) [hereinafter N.J. PRIVACY REPORT].
96. Id. at 18.
97. Testimony before the Privacy Study Commission is on file with the author and at the
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs. See National Network to End Domestic
Violence, supra note 46.
98. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 27.
99. Id.
100. Daniel J. Solove is an associate professor of law at George Washington University Law
School.
The George Washington University Law School, Daniel J. Solove,
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
101. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

80

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:63

addresses and telephone numbers under open government records statutes, he
explained, would constitute a departure from the federal approach under the
FOIA 102 and could potentially be unconstitutional. 103 There are several groups
of people who have a strong interest in keeping their home addresses
confidential, and ample case law from federal and state courts recognizes a
state interest in preserving residential privacy. 104 Professor Solove emphasized
the following points:
1. There are very compelling reasons why people want their addresses and
phone numbers to remain private.
2. The addresses and phone numbers in public records are often not
acquired by the government voluntarily. People are compelled to
supply this information.
Without privacy protection for this
information, what the state would be doing is compelling people to
divulge information to the public that they may want to remain
confidential.
3. The Third Circuit case law, which governs in New Jersey, has
recognized that there is a constitutional interest in the nondisclosure of
personal information. 105 The government has the burden of justifying
why it needs to disclose certain personal information and why that
disclosure outweighs people’s privacy interests.
4. This issue is too important and complex for absolute rules. An
appropriate solution must balance the interests on both sides and take
into account that many people have compelling safety reasons for not
disclosing their addresses and phone numbers.
5. The primary purpose for public access to government records is to
enable the people to learn about how their government functions.
Government records are not supposed to be a way to spy on citizens or
find out the personal information they would like to keep confidential.
These aims satisfy private interests, not public ones. 106

102. Professor Solove authored a casebook entitled INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, and has
written extensively on the subject. See generally ROTENBERG & SOLOVE, supra note 51; DANIEL
J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(2004). His written testimony, and all written testimony received by the New Jersey Privacy
Study Commission, is posted on the Commission’s web site. See N.J. Privacy Study
Commission, www.nj.gov/privacy/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
103. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 24.
104. Id.
105. See A.A. v. N.J., 341 F.3d 206, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2003); Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98,
99, 101 (3d Cir. 2000); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d 367, 408-09 (N.J. 1995).
106. See N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 24-25.
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According to Professor Solove:
It is important to note that the personal information in public records is often
compelled by the government. People don’t give it out freely but are often
forced to do so. Broad disclosure of people’s addresses can compromise
people’s safety. It may benefit the media, which wants easy access to
information, and commercial interests, which want to use addresses for
marketing purposes. But in balancing under the Constitution, courts look to
the extent to which the greater public interest is served by disclosure. 107

ii. Arguments in Favor of Disclosing Home Address Information. The
Privacy Study Commission received several comments articulating the view
that no privacy interest should attach to data if the data can be found anywhere
in the public domain. 108 Therefore, they argue, such data should be available
from the state through requests for open government records. 109 This view is
consistent with much case law. 110 It is also consistent with Fourth Amendment
search-and-seizure law; the United States Supreme Court has held that unless a
matter is kept secret, it enjoys no “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 111 For
example, although the Court has found a reasonable expectation of privacy
within the four walls of the home, 112 it found no reasonable expectation of
privacy in sealed, opaque garbage bags discarded by the curb. 113
Professor Fred H. Cate told the Privacy Study Commission “that no
constitutional privacy right attaches to home addresses and home telephone
numbers.” 114 In his view, “the constitution does not prohibit public access to
home addresses . . . in government records.” 115 Indeed, “he stated that the
Constitution permits and even encourages public access to such
information.” 116

107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 42.
109. Id.
110. See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Public Records § 107 (2005) (“The right of privacy is not
infringed by the publication of matters of public record.”).
111. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
112. See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
113. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988).
114. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 28. Professor Cate is a professor at Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington, Indiana. Id. at 28 n.29. His research and his trip to New
Jersey were supported by the Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access, a not-for-profit group
funded by businesses that “aggregate and enhance public records for public use.” Statement on
the Constitutionality of the Disclosure of Name and Address Information from Public Records:
Hearing on Address and Telephone Information in Public Records, N.J. Privacy Study
Commission 1 (2003) (statement of Fred Cate, Professor, Indiana University School of LawBloomington),
http://www.law.indiana.edu/people/cate/Testimony/Cate.New%20Jersey.pdf
[hereinafter Cate Statement].
115. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 28.
116. Id.
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According to Professor Cate, “there is no right to privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution that would speak in any way to the government’s disclosure of
home address” information. 117 He testified that no court has found a
constitutional right of privacy with respect to information such as home
address. 118 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for
example, struck down the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, stating that “neither
the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found a constitutional right to
privacy with respect to the type of information found in motor vehicle records.
Indeed, this is the very sort of information to which individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.” 119 The case, Condon v. Reno, was
reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds. 120
Professor Cate stated that only one U.S. Supreme Court case, Whalen v.
Roe, has articulated a constitutional right in the nondisclosure of information,
and that it did so in the context of nondisclosure to the government, rather than
any obligation of nondisclosure by the government. 121 He further stated that
the U.S. Supreme Court had never decided a case in which it found that
disclosure to or by the government violated the constitutional right recognized
in Whalen. 122 He cited U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 123 for the proposition that if
government agencies decline to publish information, the agencies should have
the burden to show that dissemination of the information would inflict specific
and significant harm on individuals. 124
Professor Cate acknowledged that the government legally owes a higher
obligation to individual citizens than do private companies of nonprofit
groups. 125 For constitutional and practical reasons, pertaining to the Fourth
Amendment and the non-competitive environment in which it operates, the
government has a higher obligation with regard to its own collection and use of
information. 126 He supported the proposition that certain categories of
information might be exempt from disclosure. 127 In certain circumstances, for
example, involving undercover police officers and people protected by
restraining orders, he said, “it would be reasonable to conclude that despite the
117. Id. at 29.
118. Id.
119. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1998).
120. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
121. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 29.
122. Id.
123. 182 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999).
124. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 29. As to this standard, see infra notes 156-60
and accompanying text.
125. Home Addresses and Telephone Numbers in Government Records: Public Hearing, N.J.
Privacy Study Commission 87 (2003) (testimony of Fred Cate, Professor, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington), www.nj.gov/privacy/ph_111203.pdf [hereinafter Cate Testimony].
126. Id. at 88.
127. Cate Statement, supra note 114, at 7.
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constitutional values served by public access, [home] address . . . [information]
should be protected.” 128 With respect to categories such as medical records, he
said that “most people would accept that there probably should be some limit
on disclosing the names and addresses of people who have certain diseases[,
but that] the state . . . [should nevertheless] provide aggregate information on
the . . . reported incidents of . . . diseases and . . . the locations of the people
who have them.” 129 Although Professor Cate saw no harm per se in publishing
Social Security numbers on the Internet, he acknowledged that it would be
possible and in some cases, appropriate to disaggregate identifiers like the
Social Security Number before publishing the “anonymized” remainder of a
governmental record. 130
III. CAN INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVIVE?
A common view of the right to privacy holds that if a piece of information
can be found anywhere in the public domain, it should be available from the
state through open government records requests. 131 For example, if a citizen’s
home address can be found in the telephone book, voter registration records, or
property tax records, this view holds that there is no “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” and therefore the state should disclose the home address when it
appears as part of any government record. 132
On this view, it is tempting to think the right to information privacy has
vanished. Under open government records statutes, it is the state, rather than
commercial enterprise, disclosing information about individuals. This makes a
difference. 133 An individual’s home address may be found in a telephone book
or on the Internet, but this fact does not justify action by the government to
disclose the same home address where the individual has an expectation of

128. Id.
129. Cate Testimony, supra note 125, at 61.
130. Id. at 27.
131. See, e.g., Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2000).
132. This view is consistent with criminal search-and-seizure laws. The United States
Supreme Court has held that, under the Fourth Amendment, unless a matter is kept secret, it
enjoys no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”“ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring). For example, the Court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy
in sealed, opaque garbage bags discarded by the curb. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 4041 (1988). On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment, which protects “the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” establishes a reasonable expectation of
privacy within the four walls of the home. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 34 (2001)
(thermal imaging). See generally Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1121-24 (2002).
133. See Kinsella v. Welch, 827 A.2d 325, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (explaining
the distinction between the constitutional right of privacy, which pertains to government action,
and its common law namesake, which pertains to non-governmental action).
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privacy and, indeed, has no alternative but to give the information to the
government.
A.

Open Government Records and the Constitutional Right to Privacy

Improper disclosure of information by the government is a recognized
injury. 134 The courts recognize a privacy interest every time the government
discloses an individual’s home address, even when the disclosure results in
only a minimal effect, such as unsolicited contact. 135 The government has a
duty to protect the privacy of individuals who have taken steps to protect
themselves. 136 This is true despite, and indeed because of, the technological
advances that have made individuals vulnerable to unwarranted intrusions.
State action has a constitutional dimension. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Whalen v. Roe has generated appellate precedent for the
proposition that the state is not free to disclose confidential information about
its citizens. 137 A majority of circuit courts have accepted the constitutional
right to information privacy. 138
The Third Circuit has articulated the constitutional right to information
privacy, and repeatedly found a specific privacy interest in home address
information. 139 In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the court

134. See, e.g., Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354-55 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
voter registration system found to be unconstitutional because it required voters to disclose their
Social Security numbers publicly in order to vote).
135. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500-01
(1994).
136. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he
Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the State may gather, but also on the
means it may use to gather it. The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information. . . .”).
137. See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 194, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2000);
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 839-41, 848 (1st Cir. 1987); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554, 1558-59 (2d Cir. 1983).
138. See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Walls v. City of Petersburg,
895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559; United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-580 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th
Cir. 1978). One circuit court has expressed “grave doubts” as the existence of the right, but has
stopped short of confronting the issue of whether the right existed. Am. Fed’n. of Govt.
Employees v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Sixth
Circuit recognizes the right, but only as a narrow corollary to the decisional privacy cases,
pertaining to personal information relating to one’s health, family, children, and other interests
protected by the Court’s substantive due process right to privacy decisions. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653
F.2d 1080, 1089-90 (6th Cir. 1981).
139. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that case law
“reflect[s] the general understanding that home addresses are entitled to some privacy protection,
whether or not so required by a statute”).
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described a balancing test to determine whether an individual’s interest in
privacy outweighs the public interest in disclosure:
The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an intrusion into
an individual’s privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in
which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and whether there is an
express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access. 140

Under this analysis, the government’s disclosure of home addresses under
open government records statutes may in some cases violate a constitutionally
protected right to privacy. 141 This would occur if an individual’s interest in
confidentiality outweighed the government’s interest in disclosure, but a
government agency nevertheless disclosed the information. 142
Of course, many people do not care if their addresses are published.
However, for some it can be a matter of life or death. Rebecca Shaffer, for
example, was killed by a stalker who got her address from motor vehicle
records. 143 The fact that some - or even most - people allow their home
addresses to be published by commercial entities does not mean that the
government should disclose the same information about the few who do not.
As the Third Circuit explained:
The compilation of home addresses in widely available telephone directories
might suggest a consensus that these addresses are not considered private were
it not for the fact that a significant number of persons, ranging from public
officials and performers to just ordinary folk, choose to list their telephones
privately, because they regard their home addresses to be private information.
Indeed, their view is supported by decisions holding that home addresses are
entitled to privacy under FOIA, which exempts from disclosure personal files

140. 638 F.2d at 578.
141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
142. The constitutional interest in residential privacy has been held to outweigh the 6th
Amendment right of confrontation. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9, 14-15 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (name of anonymous victim); Montez v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76, 81-82
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (home addresses of witnesses); People v. Lewis, 184 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33-34
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (home addresses of arresting police officers). But see Reid v.
Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a victim’s right to
privacy “cannot provide the basis for a. . .court. . .to interfere with the defendant’s normally
unrestricted right to contact prosecution witnesses”).
143. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 n.4 (D. S.C. 1997). See also Remsburg v.
Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001, 1005-06, 1008-09 (N.H. 2003) (Amy Boyer was murdered by
stalker who obtained her home address via commercial database.).
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“the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.” 144

Even loathsome members of society, such as sex offenders, have
constitutional rights, including a limited privacy interest in home address
information. In Doe v. Poritz, the New Jersey Supreme Court reluctantly
concluded that “under both the Federal and State Constitutions, the
Registration and Notification Laws implicate protectable liberty interests in
privacy and reputation, and therefore trigger the right to due process.” 145 The

144. Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)).
145. 662 A.2d 367, 420 (N.J. 1995). The public reaction to Doe v. Poritz was outrage.
Proposes Constitutional Amendment Establishing that State may make Available to General
Public Certain Information Identifying Sex Offenders: Public Hearing Before the Assembly Law
and Public Safety Committee, Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 1, 1-2 (2000), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/Pubhear/060100gg.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
The state constitution was amended to provide that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this
Constitution and irrespective of any right or interest in maintaining confidentiality, it shall be
lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law the disclosure to the general public of information
pertaining to the identity, specific and general whereabouts, physical characteristics and criminal
history of persons found to have committed a sex offense.” N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 12
(adopted Nov. 7, 2000 and effective date of Dec. 7, 2000). The constitutional amendment
stripped sex offenders of any right to privacy of their home address, but left the right to privacy
intact for others. Proposes Constitutional Amendment Establishing that State may make
Available to General Public Certain Information Identifying Sex Offenders: Public Hearing
Before the Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee, Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 1,
1-2 (2000), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/Pubhear/060100gg.PDF (last
visited Nov. 18, 2005). The transcript of a public hearing makes it clear that this was the intent of
the sponsors of the constitutional amendment:
What we are looking to do with this constitutional amendment is to see that, once and for
all, the public’s right to have knowledge about sexual predators is actually provided and
that there is constitutional backing to allow such disclosure.Many of us, myself included,
believe that, under both the New Jersey Constitution as well as the U.S. Constitution,
notwithstanding the provisions of the 14th Amendment, that this right exists today. And
nevertheless, given that there are those in the 3rd Circuit, as well as perhaps on our State
Supreme Court, who feel differently, we want to make sure that there is no ambiguity as
to the intent of this Legislature, and hopefully the administration, in terms of seeing that
this information is information which rightly should be broadly disseminated. The
question, constitutionally, is whether or not the privacy rights of the individual sex
offenders takes precedence over the public’s right to know. We strongly believe that the
right to know and to protect the public, given the nature and the high probability of
recidivism of many of these offenders, clearly is of greater import than the protection of
privacy rights of the individuals in question.
Id. Perhaps paradoxically, the full implication of the constitutional amendment is that, while sex
offenders have been stripped of any privacy interest in home address information, that interest
remains intact, and more specifically so, for other members of society. See id.
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Court explained that “disclosure of plaintiff’s home address, particularly when
coupled with the other information disclosed, implicates a privacy interest.” 146
[T]he question of whether an individual has a privacy interest in his or her bare
address does not fully frame the issue. The more meaningful question is
whether inclusion of the address in the context of the particular requested
record raises significant privacy concerns, for example because the inclusion
of the address can invite unsolicited contact or intrusion based on the
additional revealed information. 147

i. Home Addresses Appear In Context. One objection to the assertion of
constitutional protection for home address information is that legal authorities
to date have dealt with compilations of personal information, rather than access
merely to home addresses. 148 As noted above, in Doe v. Poritz and Paul P. v.
Verniero, the courts did not consider whether the plaintiffs had a privacy
interest in home address information alone, but whether the inclusion of the
plaintiffs’ addresses, along with other information, implicated any privacy
interests. 149
This objection does not account for the fact that home addresses are always
disclosed in a context. Home address information would be almost
meaningless if it were disclosed in a vacuum; it is hard to imagine that there
would be any public interest in privacy with respect to a bare listing of
residences. Only when paired with other data - name, income, disability status,
etc. does home address information invoke a public interest in privacy. In
some cases, the context of the information may touch an individual privacy
interest that is sensitive enough to invoke statutory or constitutional
protection. 150
Different jurisdictions have adopted different standards to determine
whether personally identifiable information should be disclosed under open
government records laws. Some recommend creating categories of individuals
whose home addresses and telephone numbers would be exempt from

146. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 409.
147. Id.
148. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 399, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1999); Poritz, 662 A.2d at
409.
149. See A.A. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206, 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that (1) sex
offenders’ right of privacy in their home addresses gave way to the state’s compelling interest to
prevent sex offenses, (2) the state’s internet publication of their home addresses did not violate
offenders’ constitutional privacy rights, and (3) the state’s compilation of information on them,
including offenders’ names, ages, race, birth date, height, weight, and hair color, did not violate
offenders’ constitutional right to privacy).
150. See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (lists
that contain only names and addresses carry significance because of context).
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disclosure. 151 Others, by contrast, recommend that records custodians be given
discretion to deny access when there is clear evidence of the substantial
likelihood of harm or threat resulting from the disclosure of personal
information. 152
There has been a split in the circuits on this issue. The Tenth Circuit has
held that “the government must show that the dissemination of the information
desired to be kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on
individuals. . . .” 153 The District of Columbia Circuit came out the other way
on a very similar issue, holding that the government may restrict disclosure of
people’s names and addresses in spite of a corporation’s First Amendment
claim of entitlement to the information. 154
However, even under a “clear evidence of substantial likelihood of harm”
standard, home address information has a constitutional dimension. In
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, for example, the defense attorney for forty-one
defendants charged with drug conspiracy sought the names and addresses from
the personnel files of the police officers involved in the arrests. 155 The court
held that release of the information invaded the police officers’ privacy
because it exposed them to a substantial risk of harm. 156 Not only did it
implicate their fundamental interest in personal safety, it also violated their
constitutional rights. 157 “The City’s release of private information . . . rises to
constitutional dimensions by threatening the personal security and bodily
integrity of the officers and their family members. . . .” 158 The information
extended beyond addresses; however, the court’s reasoning suggests that the
primary concern giving rise to the privacy interest was the officers’ safety, and
it is the address information that was central to these safety concerns. 159
The purpose of open government records statutes is to shed light on the
operations of government agencies, not to publish information about
individuals. 160 Government agencies should not publish home addresses if the
effect of the disclosure would be solely to disclose personal information about
an individual, especially if the disclosure would shed no light on the conduct of
151. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254.21 (2003) (banning the posting of the home address
or telephone number of any elected or appointed official); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.33 (2003)
(making an elected official the custodian of his or her records).
152. See, e.g, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (2003).
153. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999).
154. Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
155. 136 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1998).
156. Id. at 1069.
157. Id. at 1069-70.
158. Id. at 1064. For additional information on the public disclosure of the personal
information of police officers, see Adam Liptak, A Web Site Causes Unease in Police: Its Creator
Posts Personal Data on Officers in Washington State, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 2003, at A12.
159. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059, 1067.
160. See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
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a public agency or official or on other governmental matters of significance to
the public. 161 Instead of creating castes in society, where some groups of
people get special treatment, there should be categories of records that are
accessible and non-accessible. The safety of one group of people is no more
important than that of another group.
ii. Other Confidential Information. Home address information illustrates a
wider debate about the extent to which state actors should disclose information
about citizens pursuant to open government records requests. Other data items
may deserve confidential treatment as well, even if no specific statute were to
speak to the specific datum. 162 It would violate the public interest in privacy if
state and local government agencies were to disclose information to the public
that would otherwise be unobtainable. Especially serious are examples of
government records that contain sensitive information.
For example,
municipal recreation department records often include children’s records,
which may contain birth dates, emergency phone numbers, and medical
conditions.
Generally, the public should not have access to government records if the
primary effect of the disclosure would be the dissemination of sensitive
personal information about a particular private person, rather than shedding
light on the conduct of a government agency or official or on other matters of
significance to the public. 163

161. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). This case
involved a First Amendment challenge to a California statute that limited public access to the
home address of people who had been arrested. Id. at 34, 36. The statute allowed access for
“scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purpose, or . . . for investigation purposes,” but
prohibited access that would be used for commercial purposes. Id. at 34-35. In the course of
holding that the statute was not subject to facial challenge, and remanding for further
proceedings, the Court noted that the state “could decide not to give out arrestee information at all
without violating the First Amendment.” Id. at 40. See also Mainstream Mktg. Serv. v. FTC, 358
F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Do Not Call list against a First Amendment
challenge); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2003)
(upholding restrictions on junk faxes against First Amendment challenge).
162. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977) (holding that the
president had a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in the records containing his private
communications with his family).
163. The common law of “invasion of privacy” informs, to some extent, the public interest in
privacy. According to American Jurisprudence, “[t]he right of privacy is not infringed by the
publication of matters of public record.” 62A AM. JUR. 2d Public Records § 107 (2005). Under
open government records statutes, however, it is the government, rather than commercial
enterprise, disclosing information about individuals. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (2003).
This makes a difference. Most states have adopted a system of categorizing four different kinds
of invasions of privacy. The four torts are: (1) “unreasonable publicity” of “private life,” (2)
“intrusion,” such as hidden videotape cameras, (3) “appropriation,” such as the commercial use of
someone’s name, image, or likeness, and (4) “false light” publicity that places someone in a false
light in the public eye. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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iii. No Sanctions for Reporting Information the Government Has
Published. It is well established that the government may not impose sanctions
for re-publication of information that has been obtained through governmental
channels. The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down a number of statutes
that prohibited the disclosure of information obtained from government
records. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn established that a state may not sanction
the press for publishing true information that has been disclosed in public court
documents. 164 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court,
held that the state could not prohibit the media from disclosing information
about a child when the media obtained the information by attending juvenile
court proceedings. 165 In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court struck
down a statute prohibiting the publication of names of juvenile offenders,
saying “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order. 166This principle was reiterated in Florida Star v. B.J.F., where a
newspaper published the name of a rape victim, which it obtained from a
police report. 167 “We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest
order . . . .” 168
These cases support the proposition that once the government makes
information public, the government cannot subsequently sanction its further
disclosure. However, the cases do not establish that the government has an
obligation to disclose the information in the first instance. Indeed, in Cox
Broadcasting, the Court noted that it was not reaching “any constitutional
questions which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public
and press to various kinds of official records . . . .” 169
There is an important distinction between conditions that might be placed on
government records before they are disclosed, and restrictions or sanctions that
are imposed after access has already been obtained. 170 The First Amendment
prohibits the state from placing post-access restrictions on disclosure, but it does
not compel the state to disclose all records in the government’s files. 171

164. 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975).
165. 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977).
166. 443 U.S. 97, 98-99, 103 (1979).
167. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
168. Id. at 541.
169. 420 U.S. at 496 n.26.
170. See generally Solove, supra note 1 (providing a full analysis of the jurisprudence of
“unconstitutional conditions” as they attach to government records).
171. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, government agencies, including local governments, may be
exposed to lawsuits if the agencies violate the constitution. 172 If public
agencies were to disclose personal information, such as home addresses, under
all circumstances, they could become subject to constitutional challenges that
they may or may not win. The better course is to empower public agencies to
comply with requests for government records and still protect individual
privacy.
iv. Data Accuracy. A common rationale for collecting information about
citizens from government records is that the government data is used for
verification, to enhance the quality and accuracy of the data in commercial
databases. The first known sampling, however, of individuals’ records
compiled by two large data aggregators, ChoicePoint and Acxiom, found
significant inaccuracy rates in personal data. 173
The study, organized by Privacy Activism, was based on eleven
volunteers, who ordered their “ChoicePoint ScreenNow” background checks,
which cost $20 each, and their Acxiom background reports, which cost $5. 174
They found that 100 percent of the ChoicePoint records had at least one
error. 175 Over one-third of the eleven participants never received their Acxiom
reports, and 67% of the reports received had errors. 176
ChoicePoint claims to have 17 billion records on individuals and
businesses, and sells data to 40 percent of the nation’s top 1,000 companies. 177
It also has contracts with major U.S. law enforcement and homeland security
agencies. 178 Its overall error rate was 35 percent. 179 Acxiom, another
aggregator, primarily serves the financial services industry. 180 Companies can
submit rosters of their customers to Acxiom, which can then provide

172. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the City of Columbus from disclosing certain personal
information contained in police officers’ personnel files).
173. See LINDA ACKERMAN & DEBORAH PIERCE, PRIVACY ACTIVISM, DATA
AGGREGATORS: A STUDY OF DATA QUALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS 1 (2005),
http://www.privacyactivism.org/docs/DataAggregatorsStudy.pdf. See e.g., Houston Chronicle
Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (finding that no effort
was made to purge inaccurate or misleading entries on the “rap sheet” in question).
174. ACKERMAN & PIERCE, supra note 174, at 2-4.
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id. at 1, 7.
177. ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 145 (2005); ChoicePoint Annual Meeting
of Shareholders, ChoicePoint, http://www.choicepoint.net/choicepoint/news/feature042903.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
178. O’HARROW, supra note 178, at 156.
179. ACKERMAN & PIERCE, supra note 174, at 5.
180. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, ACXIOM CORP. 4 (2005), available at http://www.acxiom.com/
AppFiles/Download18/2005_Annual_Report-3BFCD5AD-85A1-45ED-A106AFC876B81142.pdf.
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customers’ telephone numbers and data on home ownership or estimated
income. 181 Acxiom’s error rate was 13 percent. 182
The authors of the study acknowledged its limitations. 183 “It is important
to note that due to the small size of the data set, and the non-random
distribution of participants, care should be taken in projecting this data to the
full population. As participants in the FTC Round-table noted, a detailed
national study would be extremely difficult and expensive, and so it is
worthwhile beginning with smaller studies such as this.” 184
However, they said their findings could indicate a larger problem.
The results from the study strongly imply a high rate of serious errors in
the information provided by two of the largest data brokers in the United
States, as well as a lack of responsiveness to consumers requesting their own
information. While the small sample size means we do not consider these
results definitive, the figures unequivocally point to a need for a much larger
study. 185

B.

Court Records

Court records provide another mother lode of information with commercial
value. They are being mined electronically and on paper to obtain information
about individuals, for purposes totally unrelated to the reasons the information
first landed in the courthouse. 186 As with open government records statutes,
the reasons for keeping records open to the public have more to do with
supporting our democratic system of government than with the individuals
whose records are in the system.
This may seem paradoxical at first glance. Court records have long been
presumed open to the public, and the tradition of public access to court case
files is rooted in constitutional principles. 187 Upon examination and reflection,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

O’HARROW, supra note 178, at 49-52.
ACKERMAN & PIERCE, supra note 174, at 5.
Id. at 2, 5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE 4, available at http://www.cfp2002.org/proceedings/proceedings/givens.pdf.
187. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1312 (1978) (“It is clear that courts
of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents,
including judicial records and documents.”); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp
1308, 1309 (D. Utah 1987) (acknowledging a constitutional right to access public documents
based on Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583-84 (1980), which stated that
the First Amendment is based on access to information and Press- Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984), which stated “a claim to access cannot succeed unless access
makes a positive contribution to this process of self-governance”).
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however, it is apparent that, as with open government records, the question of
what is “public” should be the beginning rather than the end of the analysis. 188
i. Court Records Are Open to the Public Not Because They Are
“Newsworthy,” But for the Purpose of Keeping the System Honest. The
presumption of public access to court records allows the citizenry to monitor
the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty, and respect for
our legal system. 189 But it does not follow that every piece of personal
information contained within a “public” record in the courthouse needs to be
published worldwide on the Internet. Publication of court records should be
tailored to serve the court’s proper civic purposes, not to broadcast personally
identifiable information like Social Security numbers.
The reasons for keeping court records open to the public are several,
reflecting the balance of powers among the branches of government and civic
principles of government based upon the rights and duties of the individual. 190
For example, in criminal cases, open trials prevent prosecutorial
misconduct. 191 A very important aspect of criminal law in this country is the
principle of holding law enforcement to its burden of proof. 192 The executive
branch, in the person of the prosecutor, is obliged not merely to conduct
zealous prosecutions, but to serve the broader interests of justice. 193 Criminal
courts are open, therefore, in part to ensure that prosecutorial zeal is checked
by rigorous legal standards.
In civil cases, court proceedings are open to the public for a number of
reasons. Before damages are awarded, injunctions enforced, or money
transferred from one pocket to another, our system demands that the process of
adjudication be exposed to scrutiny.
The reasons for keeping the system open to the public have to do with the
health and well-being of our legal system, not for the benefit of consumer

188. “Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably
significant invasion of privacy.” U.S. Dep’t. of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991). The
Supreme Court emphasized in Ray that the disclosure of a list of names pursuant to a FOIA
request was not inherently or always a threat to privacy, but “depends upon the characteristics
revealed by virtue of being on the particular list, and the consequences likely to ensue.” Id. at 176
n.12 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 877 (1989)).
189. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-77 (finding that the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials is predicated on openness, fairness, perception, and
confidence in governmental process).
190. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1173 (listing four functions of government transparency).
191. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (stating that open trials assure that
proceedings are conducted fairly and discourage perjury and misconduct).
192. See U.S. v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 461 (1827) (“In criminal proceedings, the onus
probandi rests upon the prosecutor, unless a different provision is expressly made by statute.”).
193. 27 C.J.S. District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 29 (1999) (discussing prosecutorial
duties).
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profiling or other commercial interests. 194 The Constitution provides for jury
trials not only to determine questions of fact, but also to make the community
an integral part of the judicial system. 195 Open court records similarly serve an
important educational function: not to titillate the masses with news of their
neighbors’ misfortunes, but to support a functioning democracy. 196
Government records empower citizens to make good political decisions. Court
records publish final judgments and liens, facilitating business, and personal
and legal affairs. 197
ii. The Legal System Is Not About the Litigants, but About SelfGovernment. It is tempting to think that the American court system revolves
around the litigants, i.e., the plaintiff and defendant. To the contrary, the jury
trial right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (civil trials) forms an
important part of the American system of self-government. 198
The core interest underlying the American judicial system is not the
interest of the parties, but of the citizens - the jurors and the gallery - who
monitor the judges, the witnesses, the prosecutors, the police and the lawyers.
Open public trials give the public an opportunity to deter corruption in the
system.
The institution of the jury . . . places the real direction of society in the hands
of the governed . . . . . . and not in that of the government. . . . . [It] invests the
people, or that class of citizens, with the direction of society.
. . . The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as
direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as

194. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)
(“[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of
the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances
the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the
defendant and to society as a whole.”); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976)
(“[F]ree and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well
as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and
public accountability.”).
195. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979).
196. Id. at 429; Anne-Marie Moyes, Note, Assessing the Risk of Executing the Innocent: A
Case for Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA Testing, 55 VAND. L. REV.
953, 986 (2002).
197. John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer
Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 124 (1992).
198. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289, 295 (1966) (stating that the Seventh Amendment concerning jury trials in civil cases
was a principal Antifederalist demand); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 667-669, 678 (1973) (explaining that the Seventh
Amendment was a reaction to the powerful government established by the Constitution, and
antifederalists sought to protect debtors and litigants from oppressive judges).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS

95

universal suffrage. They are two instruments of equal power, which contribute
to the supremacy of the majority. 199

For this reason, African-Americans and women have struggled for the right
to serve on juries, not for the benefit of the parties, but for the sake of being
part of the system. 200 The infusion of these groups’ knowledge into the system
also serves the overarching social purpose of protecting the innocent from
erroneous verdicts of liability. 201
Traditionally, documents that make it through the courthouse door become
part of the public record and open to scrutiny. However, this tradition was not
intended for the purpose of broadcasting details about the litigants. 202
Government records are made available to the public so that citizens can make
political decisions, to instill confidence in the system, to make the government
accountable, and to facilitate business, personal and legal affairs. 203
iii. The Legal System is Not So Much About a “Search for Truth” As
About Resolving Conflicts. Very few “facts” are proved to a conclusion in the
American system. Only a fraction of lawsuits actually proceed to trial. 204 This
means that most of the “facts” recited in pleadings are not tested. Moreover,
there is a certain amount of “puffing” that goes into pleadings. 205 If they are
disseminated over the Internet, and especially if they are “newsworthy,” there
are no guarantees whatever that any of the information on the Internet will be
reliable. This lack of reliability stands to undermine the perception of fairness
and trust in the legal system.

199. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94 (1945); see also Gannett,
443 U.S. at 428-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (finding that the public should be
educated about the manner in which criminal justice is administered); Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Democracies die behind closed doors.”).
200. Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 921 (2003).
201. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986).
202. For this reason, discovery is not conducted in public domain, but in confidence. Indeed,
the government has a substantial interest in controlling and preventing discovery abuse. See
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 690 (Wash. 1982); see also Wilk v. Am. Med.
Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (7th Cir. 1981) (suggesting a party would not be entitled to a
hearing if it brought suit solely to obtain discovery material); Hammock v. Hoffman LaRoche,
Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 558 (N.J. 1995) (finding that the public interest in health and welfare may be
invoked to prevent abuse of discovery for commercial gain or competitive advantage).
203. Robert Gellman, Public Records – Access, Privacy, and Public Policy: A Discussion
Paper, 12 GOV’T INFO. Q., 391, 395 (1995).
204. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 29
(1984).
205. R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3,
7 (1987).
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Part of this hazard is the nature of the American adversary system. 206 The
primary objective of the adversary system is not so much to seek material truth
as to resolve disputes in a way that will be acceptable to the parties and to
society. If the search for truth were supreme, privileges would not be
recognized, and the vast majority of cases would not be resolved on consent.
The difficulty with publishing every data item that comes into the
courthouse is that although it would preserve the principle that judicial
proceedings should be conducted in public, there is a substantial risk that overpublication will have a chilling effect. When people lose control over
information about themselves, they change their behavior in ways that may
harm society. 207 The judiciary has recognized this; there is ample precedent
for limiting disclosure when a chilling effect looms over litigants. 208 The
subpoena power, for example, can easily be used to destroy privacy and
confidentiality, hence there are clearly defined restrictions and limitations on
its use. 209
If litigants, jurors, and witnesses lose control over confidential information
about themselves, they will similarly adopt privacy-protective behaviors, most
likely by refusing to participate in the justice system. This raises a significant
risk to public confidence in the court system and to our functioning democracy.
iv. Much of the System is Secret, While Individuals Are Exposed. Personal
information about individuals is a valuable commodity in the United States,
where large commercial data aggregation companies sell Social Security
numbers 210 and create consumer profiles for profit. 211 These companies, like

206. LANDSMAN, supra note 205, at 13 (finding that the adversary system evolved with the
development of the jury system).
207. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2nd Cir. 1987); Gaull v. Wyeth
Labs. 687 F. Supp 77, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 379 F. Supp.
2d 680, 689 (M.D. Penn. 2005).
209. Privileges are recognized where four conditions are met: 1) communications originates
in confidence, 2) confidentiality is essential for the relationship, 3) the relationship is fostered in
the community, and 4) injury from disclosure outweighs the benefit. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 at 527 (1961) (citing Falsone v. U.S., 205 F.2d
734 (5th Cir. 1953); U.S. v. Funk, 84 F. Supp 967 (E.D. Ky. 1949); O’Toole v. Ohio G.F. Ins.
Co., 123 N.W. 795 (Mich. 1909); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1956)).
210. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: PRIVATE
SECTOR ENTITIES ROUTINELY OBTAIN AND USE SSNS, AND LAWS LIMIT THE DISCLOSURE OF
THIS INFORMATION (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0411.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT,
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS].
211. In Europe, by contrast, information privacy is protected by law. See Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder
Flows
of
Personal
Data,
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last
visited Jan. 29, 2006).
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ChoicePoint and Reed Elsevier, work very hard to extract personal information
about people from court records. 212
Meanwhile, much information about the judicial system itself remains
secret. For example, the courts operate with public money, but decisions as to
the allocation of budget monies are made in secret. 213 These decisions affect
the public, but the public is not informed as to how or why they are made.
State courts offer many programs affecting the operation of the judicial system,
such as mediation, arbitration, child custody, and pretrial intervention. 214 “All
of these programs cost time and money, and affect court personnel, litigants,
lawyers and the public.” 215 They are adopted in a process that is not
publicized. 216 Thus, individuals are exposed to scrutiny, while much of the
system itself remains secret.
v. Courthouse Data Generates Profits for Data Aggregators While
Potentially Harming Individuals. Civil cases are filed because litigants have
failed to reach a private compromise. This fact does not transform the
litigants’ pleadings, or evidence submitted with motion practice, into a
commodity that should be public for any and all purposes. Inaccuracies spawn
statistics and perceptions that are incorrect.
The judiciary has been wary of discovery abuse for commercial gain (or
competitive advantage), and its concerns should extend to other aspects of
administering justice. 217 Unhindered access to case files may result in a further
increase in identity theft. Marketers may take advantage of compiled records
to target advertising at former litigants and witnesses. Personal information
that is disclosed for the purposes of litigation could unfairly stigmatize a
litigant in his or her future pursuit of employment or educational
opportunities. 218

212. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, ChoicePoint, http://www.epic.org/privacy/
choicepoint/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) (listing ChoicePoint as a company that sells information
and listing Reed Elsevier as a “private sector data seller” along with ChoicePoint, Experian, Polk,
Seisint and Acxiom).
213. Martin L. Haines, Privacy in the Courts v. the Public Right to Know, N.J. LAW., Feb.
2002, at 37.
214. See, e.g., id. at 39 (discussing New Jersey).
215. Id.
216. Although Judge Haines argues that all of the programs are adopted in a process
involving extensive unwritten reports, the author disagrees with this statement and believes
instead that many, but not all programs are adopted in such a way. See id.
217. Security is also an important aspect of electronic access to court files, as electronic files
can be hacked, modified, stolen and misused. See Michael Whiteman, Appellate Court Briefs on
the Web: Electronic Dynamos or Legal Quagmire?, 97 L. LIBR. J. 467, 476-78 (2005) (discussing
various privacy concerns related to electronic filing).
218. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181-82 (1990) (showing that the fact that
information has been disclosed to one individual does not mean that it can be freely disclosed to
another – a guest in somebody’s home cannot open the door to the police to conduct a search).
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vi. To Say “Public is Public” Is Too Simplistic. Just because a piece of
information is in a “public record” ’does not mean it can be published for any
purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court explained this at length in U.S. Department
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 219 “[There is a]
privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even
where the information may have been at one time public.” 220 One need not
maintain perfect secrecy in order to maintain a degree of confidentiality.
“[T]he fact that an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not mean that an
individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the
information.” 221
The inherent difficulty of obtaining and distributing paper files used to
effectively insulate individuals from the harm that could result from misuse of
information in government records. The Court referred to the relative
difficulty of gathering paper files as “practical obscurity,” and recognized that
it influenced the privacy equation. 222 “Plainly there is a vast difference
between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of
courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the
country and a [government-created] computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.” 223
It is overly simplistic to say that “public records are public records.” As
discussed above, court records are not public because of any inherent
characteristics; they are public for reasons that have to do with our system of
self-government.
Moreover, electronic records have attributes that
fundamentally change the premises for categorizing information as “public.”“
The judiciary should resist the temptation to rely on oversimplified arguments
that once a document can be found in the public domain it can no longer be
considered private. 224 Instead, the courts should consider afresh the reasons
for making court records public and draw a distinction among the kinds of
documents that should be made available online.
Litigants do not give up their privacy rights simply because they have walked,
voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse door. . . . The mere
payment of a filing fee entitles a plaintiff to compel production of intensely
personal and confidential information, such as medical records, marital
information, religious documents, financial records, and even trade secrets or

219. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
220. Id. at 767.
221. Id. at 770.
222. Id. at 762.
223. Id. at 764.
224. The government may not impose sanctions for publishing information the government
itself has already placed in the public domain, but it has no affirmative obligation to publish
personally identifiable information about citizens. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying
text.
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intellectual property. The defendant, of course, can respond in kind. The loss
of privacy through litigation is compounded when the information is disclosed
to the media, competitors, political adversaries, and even curious members of
the public. 225

This makes the courts and other state actors the guardians of a “public
interest in privacy.”“ The government has a duty to protect its citizens from
incursions upon their privacy interests. Instead, however, the distinction
between governmental and commercial interests is fading. Government
records are being used to build commercial databases, and governments are
purchasing commercial databases, apparently for the purpose of building
dossiers on citizens.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
Commercial databases are having an increasing impact on civil liberties,
and several recent governmental initiatives have sought to exploit privatesector databases to monitor both legal and illegal activity. As a result, federal
statutes have been eviscerated, civil rights compromised, and constitutional
protections weakened.
A.

The Distinction Between Governmental and Commercial Databases

A current myth about information privacy is that a meaningful distinction
can be drawn between governmental and commercial databases. The myth is
pervasive for two reasons: 1) we have internalized the metaphor of Big Brother
as a governmental entity; and 2) the word “private” sometimes means “nongovernmental” (as in “private sector”). 226 In reality, however, the distinction is
softening, with significant implications for the privacy interests of
individuals. 227
i. Commercial Databases Are Being Used to Eviscerate Statutory
Protections. The federal government is using commercial databases to bypass
statutory requirements. For example, commercial databases are being used to
circumvent the Privacy Act. 228 Federal agencies purchase databases from
225. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 466 (1991).
226. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW AND PHIL. 559, 567-69 (1998).
227. As the Government Accountability Office recently reported, “many federal data mining
efforts involve the use of personal information that is mined from databases maintained by public
as well as private sector organizations.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING:
FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04548.pdf.
228. SENATE MAJORITY TASK FORCE ON THE INVASION OF PRIVACY, NY. SENATE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (Mar. 2000), http://www.senate.state.ny/Docs/nyspriv00.pdf; 5 U.S.C. §
552a (2004).
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companies like ChoicePoint, Dun & Bradstreet, and Lexis Nexis. 229
Commercial airlines have admitted disclosing the travel records of millions of
passengers. 230 As noted in USA Today, “JetBlue provided the records of 1.1
million passengers to a private company working on an Army security project.
By matching the data to Social Security numbers and addresses, the contractor
could create detailed dossiers for a controversial air-travel-security plan it was
promoting.” 231 JetBlue publicly apologized, but even still USA Today called
the Privacy Act “too porous to protect today’s citizens.” 232
The Department of Defense and a private contractor have been building an
extensive database of 30 million 16-to-25-year-olds, apparently in violation of
the Privacy Act, “which requires that government agencies accept public
comment before new records systems are created.” 233 The database, which has
been in development since 2002, combines names with Social Security
numbers, grade-point averages, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers. 234 The
Army has acknowledged it has been struggling to meet recruitment goals to
replenish the ranks of the all-volunteer services. 235 The Pentagon purchased
the names of 3.1 million high school graduating seniors and an additional 4.7
million college students. 236 Drawing information from motor vehicle records,
Selective Service registrations and private vendors, the database includes a
variety of personal information, including grades, height, weight, and social
security numbers. 237
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), has been similarly
compromised. For example, FCRA provides that records of bankruptcies may
be expunged after 10 years. 238 Now that bankruptcy filings are routinely
published on the Internet, commercial entities can download and keep the
229. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 600-07 (2004).
230. 1974 Privacy Act Too Porous to Protect Today’s Citizens, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 2003,
at 22A.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Damien Cave, Age 16 to 25? The Pentagon Has Your Number, and More, N. Y. TIMES,
Jun. 24, 2005, at A18.
234. Id. The Joint Advertising and Market Research Studies (JAMRS) recruiting database
was established “to provide a single central facility within the Department of Defense to compile,
process and distribute files of individuals who meet age and minimum school requirements for
military service.” Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,486 (May 23, 2005).
235. Cave, supra note 234, at A18.
236. Id.
237. Id. A Department of Defense spokesman explained that “Congress does not want
conscription, the country does not want conscription. If we don’t want conscription, you have to
give the Department of Defense, the military services, an avenue to contact young people to tell
them what is being offered.” Id.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (2005).
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bankruptcy records indefinitely in their proprietary databases. 239 Unless
individuals somehow acquire a statutory right to review, correct, and expunge
their records, there will be no practical way to clear one’s name and credit
rating - ever.
ii. Commercial Databases Are Being Used to Violate Civil Rights. State
actors have used commercial databases for purposes that have harmed and
threaten to harm civil rights such as voting rights, 240 the right to travel, 241 and
the right to associate. 242 Thousands of citizens were erroneously deleted from
the lists of registered voters in the November 2000 election, when the State of
Florida purchased records from ChoicePoint to purge the voter rolls of
convicted felons. 243 The data were inaccurate, and the disenfranchised voters
had no recourse.
The right to travel will be affected by “Secure Flight,” a program
implemented by the Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”). 244 The purpose
of Secure Flight is to match airline passengers against lists of suspected
terrorists. 245 In July 2005, however, the Government Accountability Office

239. See Letter from Tena Fiery, Research Director of Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Beth
Givens, Director of Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, & Deborah Pierce, Staff Attorney of
Electronic Frontier Foundation, to Leander Barnhill, Office of General Counsel of the Executive
Office for United States Trustees (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
bankruptcy091800.htm.
240. See infra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
241. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). The U.S. Supreme Court has long
recognized that citizens enjoy a constitutional right to travel. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
500 (1999).
The right to travel is a part of the “liberty” of which the citizen cannot be deprived
without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. . . . Freedom of movement
across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage.
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be
as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.
Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. . . . “Our nation,” wrote Chafee,
“has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every
American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he
pleases.”
Kent, 357 U.S. at 125-26.
242. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”).
243. Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It
May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A6.
244. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SECURE FLIGHT
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING UNDER WAY, BUT RISKS SHOULD BE MANAGED AS SYSTEM IS
FURTHER DEVELOPED (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05356.pdf.
245. See Letter from Cathleen A. Berrick, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
& Linda D. Koontz, Director of Information management Issues to Congressional Committees 1

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

102

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:63

reported that TSA was using commercial data from corporations to compile
dossiers on passengers, in order to give them a “risk score.” 246 This score in
theory would determine a prospective passenger’s “risk” to airline safety by
analyzing their credit rating, how recently they moved, what kind of job they
had, and other data. 247 The Government Accountability Office reported that
TSA violated the Privacy Act; TSA did not disclose its use of personal
information drawn from commercial sources or give the public an opportunity
to comment. 248 Indeed, TSA’s contractor “collected more than 100 million
commercial data records containing personal information . . . without
informing the public.” 249
These examples illustrate that commercial databases can be used not only
to impair the right to vote and the right to interstate travel, but also to create
secret government dossiers on individuals. The loss of anonymity can easily
be exploited to burden the First Amendment right to free association and other
liberty interests. 250
iii. Commercial Databases Create Dossiers for the Government. The
government has unmatched power to centralize all the private sector data that
is being generated for commerce. The ACLU recently reported that the
Department of Justice
has an $8 million contract with ChoicePoint that allows government agents to
tap into the company’s vast database of personal information on
individuals. . . . . . . . The Treasury Department runs a database that collects
financial information from thousands of banks and other financial

(July 22, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05864r.pdf (discussing the results
of a review of the Secure Flight Program) [hereinafter Berrick & Koontz Letter].
246. See Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies in the ‘Friendly Skies’, ALTERNET, Jul. 27, 2005,
http://www.alternet.org/rights/23728. But see Berrick & Koontz Letter, supra note 246, at 5, 7
(stating that TSA gathered the information to test the accuracy of commercial databases).
247. See Schneier, supra note 247.
248. See Berrick & Koontz Letter, supra note 246, at 6-7, 9.
249. Id. at 2.
250. Anonymity and pen names have a rich history in the United States. “Anonymous
pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of
mankind.” Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). The Federalist Papers were published
under the fictitious name “Publius,” concealing the identities of the true authors, James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. The Federalist Papers, http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/federalist/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006). Mark Twain was the pen name of Samuel Longhorne Clemens,
George Eliot of Mary Ann Evans, and Voltaire of Francois Marie Arouet. Voltaire,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voltaire (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). “Anonymity is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation – and their ideas from
suppression – at the hand of an intolerant society.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 356 (1995).
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institutions. . . . . . . . 251 [In addition, the federal Department of Education]
maintains an enormous information bank holding . . . . . . educational records
on individuals stretching from their primary school years through higher
education. Under the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI can force anyone to turn
over records on their customers or clients, giving the government unchecked
power to rifle through individuals’ financial records, medical histories, Internet
use, travel patterns, or any other records. 252

There is little oversight. Over the past 20 years, the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”), 253 congressional committees, and agency
Privacy Act officers have regularly criticized the Office of Management and
Budget for not living up to its duty as the executive branch’s Privacy Act
overseer. 254 In a detailed report, the GAO found major inconsistencies among
agencies and said guidance was sorely lacking in the area of “electronic
records.” 255
iv. The Databases Skew and Corrupt Data with Far-Reaching
Implications. When people are afraid their private information will be
misused, they resort to behaviors that have an adverse impact on society at
large. The clearest example of this is in the health care industry, where
medical patients often use deceit in order to protect themselves. 256 One out of
every six Americans now engages in some form of privacy-protective
behavior. 257 These behaviors include lying to doctors, asking doctors to lie to

251. Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of an
American Surveillance Society 8, ACLU, Jan. 2003, http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=
11572.pdf.
252. See Simpson, supra note 244, at A1 (reporting that executive branch agencies were
purchasing “troves of personal data from the private sector,” and quoting government sources for
the proposition that DOJ, FBI, USMS, INS, and IRS employees had electronic access to citizens’
assets, phone numbers, driving records, and other personal information from their desktop
computers). The article reported that ChoicePoint, a publicly-held company and its competitors
were supplying citizens’ personal information to at least thirty-five federal government agencies.
Id.
253. The Government Accountability Office was “formerly known as the General Accounting
Office. See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811
(2004); GAO’s Name Change and Other Provisions of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of
2004, www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
254. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY ACT: OMB LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO
IMPROVE AGENCY COMPLIANCE 7, 14 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03304.pdf.
255. See id. at 25.
256. See Confidentiality of Patient Records: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
House
Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong.
(2000), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/health/106cong/2-17-00/2-17gold.htm
(statement of Janlori Goldman, Director, Health Privacy Project, Inst. for Health Care Research &
Policy, Georgetown University) [hereinafter Goldman Statement].
257. Id. (quoting a 1999 survey conducted by the California Health Care Foundation).
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insurance companies, asking doctors to keep two sets of records, paying outof-pocket for services (especially psychiatric services) that are covered by
insurance, and, in the worst cases, refusing to seek treatment at all, lest the
patient’s health data be misused. 258 The most poignant example of harm is
untreated HIV infection. 259 This has a widespread negative impact because
public health data become untrustworthy. 260
Similarly, the Bureau of the Census has encountered resistance to its
constitutional mandate because of citizens’ privacy concerns. 261 In order to
encourage full compliance with requests for demographic information, census
data cannot be used for any purpose other than the statistical purpose for which
it was collected and cannot be published in any way that would permit
identification of an individual. 262
v. The Owners of Commercial Databases Exercise and Abuse Power Over
Individuals. Most individuals have no choice but to participate in commercial
databases in order to get basic services in the community. Commercial
databases can be used to create an underclass of people who have difficulty
getting jobs, cannot get credit, and for whom life is more expensive because of
a low credit score. 263 Data mining companies that perform employee
background checks keep permanent records of arrests and criminal sentences
that cannot be corrected or expunged. 264 In 2002, pharmaceutical giant Eli
Lilly fired many employees ’on the grounds they had criminal records, no
matter how remote in time or relevance to the employees’ current job

258. See id.
259. See PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES FOR THE CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE
FOUNDATION, MEDICAL PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY SURVEY 20-21 (1999), available at
http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/topline.pdf (noting that 81 out of 100 national survey
respondents believed that unique health identifiers would lead people with AIDS to avoid seeking
care for fear of being exposed).
260. See Goldman Statement, supra note 257, at 3.
261. See THOMAS S. MAYER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY
RESEARCH AND THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 2 (2002), http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/rsm2002-01.pdf.
262. See 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1997); Bureau of the Census, Census Confidentiality and Privacy:
1790-2002, http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/conmono2.pdf.
263. See HENDRICKS, supra note 41, at 13. For example, a 38-year-old single mother can lose
a job as a secretary, based on a shoplifting conviction at age 19. Even if she had the resources to
hire counsel to have her conviction expunged from the official court records, she could not
remove the black spot from commercial databases. As a consequence, she may have trouble
obtaining loans, getting jobs, and renting a domicile. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
264. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Individuals have no right to correct or
review information about themselves where the Privacy Act, FOIA and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act do not apply. Commercial databases are proprietary. If a commercial enterprise keeps
permanent records of arrests and criminal sentences, there exists no practical way for an
individual to challenge the records, much less amend or correct them.
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responsibilities. 265 Minority groups are disproportionately represented in the
vulnerable population of people who have such records. 266
The Financial Services Modernization Act, better known as GrammLeach-Bliley (“GLB”), repealed old Depression-era legislation 267 that
prevented banks, brokers, and insurers from exchanging information with each
other about their customers. 268 Under the new legislation, these financial
institutions may disclose or sell (for profit) their customers’ financial
information. 269 This information includes checks, account balances, deposits
and withdrawals, and the dates, amounts, and recipients of credit card charges.
When consumers fill out loan applications, apply for insurance, or purchase
securities, they disclose a tremendous amount of information. Financial
institutions are now free to share that information with each other and sell it to
unrelated third parties.’ 270
Some companies are collecting blood and tissue samples as well as
medical information. Genelex, a genetics company in Redmond, Washington,
“has amassed 50,000 DNA samples, many gathered surreptitiously for
paternity testing.” 271 Whether or not the DNA is collected with the
individual’s knowledge, the data may be “stored without donors’ knowledge.
Cells banked for one purpose, such as medical diagnosis, have been shared
with or sold to other users for research or profit.” 272
vi. Many Commercial Databases Are Created by Involuntary Participation
or Coercion to Obtain Basic Commodities and Services. In order to function
in society, one must interact with commercial databases. For example, one
must carry auto insurance in order to drive a car legally. One’s credit score is
even more important, not only for borrowing money, but for an increasing
265. Ann Davis, Zero Tolerance: Employers Dig Deep Into Workers’ Pasts, Citing Terrorism
Fears, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2002, at A1.
266. See HENDRICKS, supra note 41, at 235-46; see also RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO
RECORDS OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, FINAL REPORT, 12-14, June 28, 2004, available at
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/public_notices/accessreport.htm.
267. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932; Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
268. Glass Steagall Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass-Steagall_Act.
269. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq. (2000).
270. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 252, at 6. The risks associated with the redisclosure of financial information are not limited to legal transactions. Banks and other
corporations have a duty of care to their customers to ensure their personal data is not misused in
the absence of privacy statutes. Such a duty of care is eclipsed, however, by a culture of few
constraints on the treatment of personal data. This leaves corporations and law enforcement illequipped to respond to abuses of information. See Todd R. Weiss, Scope of Bank Data Theft
Grows to 676,000 Customers, COMPUTERWORLD, May 20, 2005; see also BRUCE SCHNEIER,
BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (2003).
271. Dana Hawkins, Keeping Secrets: As DNA Banks Quietly Multiply, Who is Guarding the
Safe?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 2002, at 58.
272. Id.
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number of ordinary transactions. Prospective employers, 273 landlords, 274 and
many others look at credit scores. Perhaps the most troubling recent use of the
credit score is by insurance companies to establish rates. 275 In short, one’s
ability to receive even the most basic services can come down to a number: the
credit score. 276
Medical data can show up in your credit report. 277 This “means your
banker, after seeing that credit-card payment you made to the local
psychiatrist, might decide he would rather not give you a loan.” 278 Under
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, financial institutions can sell (or give away) this
information unless you opt-out. 279
Consistent with their obligations to protect the public interest in privacy
and the constitutional right to information privacy, governmental agencies,
including the judiciary, should carefully weigh and consider the definition of
“public” for the purposes of publishing personally identifiable information.
Not every data item (such as Social Security Number) and not every record
(such as records of minor children) need be separately protected by statute in
order for state actors to meet these obligations.
B.

National ID Cards

A governmental data-collection program with considerable appeal for
many is the creation of a national identification card. In the United States,
national ID cards have been proposed - and rejected - for years, for a variety of
purposes: to streamline government services, to fight tax evasion, to secure
borders, and to make health care more affordable. 280 For the purpose of
combating terrorism, this hardy perennial has gained considerable support. 281
A major difficulty with respect to terrorism, however, is that no identification
system, no matter how sophisticated, can identify terrorists before they commit
crimes.
i. National Databases. A national ID card would be the most visible
component of a massive verification and tracking infrastructure. The card
273. Jennifer Bayot, Use of Credit Records Grows in Screening Job Applicants, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2004, § 10, at 1.
274. Motoko Rich, A Blacklist For Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at F4.
275. Beth Kobliner, Borrower Beware: Credit Scorers Are Watching, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2002, § 3, at 8.
276. If one’s credit score is too low, one will have difficulty getting a job, obtaining a loan,
getting a mortgage, renting an apartment.
277. See HENDRICKS, supra note 41, at 13.
278. See Sean Marciniak, Medical Data Can Show Up in Credit Reports, WALL ST. J., Aug.
6, 2003, at D2.
279. Id.
280. STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 252, at 6.
281. National ID Cards: 5 Reasons Why They Should Be Rejected, ACLU, Sept. 8, 2003,
http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=13501&c=39 [hereinafter National ID Cards].
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itself would be of no use without a database to verify and monitor the
movements of millions of individuals. 282 The database would require constant
attention to keep it up to date. 283 To make it work, the United States would
need a nationwide architecture, so that every airport gate worker and every
police officer would have a card-reading device. It is no wonder technology
companies have enthusiastically promoted this kind of system; its maintenance
would be spectacularly profitable. 284 Whoever creates and maintains the
database must build it to the highest levels of data security, including
transmission that prevents interception, storage that prevents theft, and systemwide architecture to prevent both intrusion and compromise by corrupt or
deceitful agents within the organization.
Even the most efficient and secure system will not protect the United
States against terrorism, however. For foreign nationals, for example, the
chain of identification begins and ends with their passports. 285 “Breeder”
documents like birth certificates and drivers’ licenses will determine the
quality of the initial enrollment or registration within the system. If a terrorist
with a fake passport were to obtain a national ID card, even one with his or her
own biometric attached, the most technologically sophisticated database would
be worthless. 286
Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that the United States had
flawlessly designed counterfeit-proof cards that could interface through a
secure “reader” to a database system that contained only well-verified lawful
information on citizens. Assume further that the information on the cards were
accessible only to properly authorized civil authorities who would never dream
282. Privacy vs. Security: Tread Carefully, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 124.
283. See National ID Cards, supra note 282.
284. See Jeffrey Rosen, Silicon Valley’s Spy Game, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 14, 2002, at 48.
285. See, e.g., Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National
Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 324 (2002). A foreign national’s ability to
prove legal residence in the United States fundamentally comes down to that individual’s
passport. If the passport is counterfeit, it may nevertheless be used to obtain a driver’s license,
Social Security number, and other identification documents.
286. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 239-40 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000); BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING
SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 193 (2003). The cure for the problem of
“breeder” documents is not simply to require more of them. See, e.g., Charles C. Mann,
Homeland Insecurity, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2002, at 81-102. Several of the 9-11
hijackers, for example, had valid drivers’ licenses, purchased illegally from employees of
Virginia’s Department of Motor Vehicles. Jerry Markon, Va. DMV Official Accused in Fraud
Probe, WASH. POST, July 13, 2005, at B5. The Commonwealth of Virginia responded by
requiring more paperwork to get a drivers license, but the solution did not fix the problem. Elaine
Rivera, Hardships Cited In Va. License Law, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at B8. An arrest in
July 2005 “marked the second time in two years that a Northern Virginia DMV employee was
accused of fraudulently selling licenses for cash. A similar scheme two years ago at the DMV . . .
led to the guilty pleas of two employees.” Markon, supra, at B5.
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of using the information for any unauthorized purpose. Unless a terrorist was
already in the database and had garnered enough suspicion to merit a full
database search, no national ID card would stop him or her at the border.
With a national ID card and its corresponding database infrastructure,
every glitch in the system would be costly. For example, if you lose a credit
card, you can cancel it and get a new one. If you lose a national ID, by
contrast, the consequences are much more significant, not just for you, but for
those who rely on the database, such as airport security guards and the police,
not to mention the technicians who operate the database. Other countries that
use national ID cards have found that their usefulness to police has been
marginal. 287 Instead of assisting law enforcement, the cards tend to become
essential for all dealings with financial institutions, government benefits,
securing employment, renting cars, and entering office buildings. 288
The venerable history of the Social Security Number illustrates the
tendency toward “function creep.” 289 The Social Security Number originally
ensured that workers paid into the system but soon became a prerequisite for
taxation and government services, and found its way into private databases as
the key to massive amounts of personal data. 290 This tendency imperils even
the most innocuous and best-intentioned identification schemes.
For example, a strong argument in favor of national ID cards is their
exculpatory value. An airline passenger could simply flash a “trusted traveler”
card at the airport and avoid being detained. 291 This would eliminate the
inconvenience of having to register with the government, would be spread
across all social groups, and would end ethnic profiling because disfavored
groups would not be singled out for negative treatment. If they were very

287. Is National ID Card the Answer?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 2001, at 3J.
288. Id.
289. See Richard Cohen, IDs All Around, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at A23.
290. See GAO REPORT, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, supra note 211, at 4.
291. The Orlando Airport is piloting a new pre-screening program called “Clear,” which, for
$80 a year, will allow travelers to use an exclusive security line with a promise of no random
secondary pat-down. Brian Bergstein, Voluntary Security ID to Debut at Florida Airport,
AIRPORT BUS. ONLINE, June 6, 2005, http://www.airportbusiness.com/article/article.jsp?id=2274
&siteSection=4. To get the identification card for this program, travelers must be vetted by the
Department of Homeland Security and submit to fingerprint and iris scans. Id. According to the
“Clear” program website, “Your Membership will be continuously reviewed by TSA’s ongoing
Security Threat Assessment Process. If your security status changes, your Membership will be
immediately deactivated and you will receive a notification email of your status change as well as
a refund of the unused portion of your annual enrollment fee.” Clear, How Clear Works,
http://www.flyclear.com/clear_howclearworks.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). Security expert
Bruce Schneier ridicules the program: “Think about it. For $80 a year, any potential terrorist can
be automatically notified if the Department of Homeland Security is on to him. Such a deal.”
Bruce Schneier, News, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSL., Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.schneier.com/cryptogram-0508.html.
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reliable, the cards could be used for writing checks, verifying credit cards, and
at traffic stops. They would become ubiquitous, but only for privileged
segments of society. For practical purposes, the more significant aspect of a
national ID system would be its potential to locate and track people,
substantially increasing the state’s police power and making it easier for the
commercial sector to classify individuals into micro-markets.
ii. Real ID. In 2005, Congress adopted a statute popularly known as “Real
ID,” which would convert one’s drivers’ license into a national ID card. 292
Every state will be required to issue a uniform drivers’ license, which must
include not only a variety of personal data but also a digital photograph of the
person (enabling face-recognition software) and possibly some other biometric
such as fingerprints or iris scans. 293 The personal data collected by any state
motor vehicle agency will be accessible to every state and local official,
including police officers and to the federal government through the
construction of a massive interconnected database of license holders from all
50 states. 294
The federalized drivers’ license must contain a standard “machine
readable” element, most likely in the form of an RFID 295 chip or the sort of
computer chip found in “smart” credit cards. 296 In practical terms, this means
that a single cheap and widely available machine (such as a bar code scanner
or RFID reader) will be able to read and store the data on all of the hundreds of
millions of drivers’ licenses in the country. 297 When a drivers’ license is used
for any type of identification (including private purchases) it can, and will, be
scanned and the data collected. 298 Banks, merchants, and health care providers
will ask for the card and harvest the data. 299 Picture, address, date of birth and
other data on the license will then be sold to data aggregators like
ChoicePoint. 300 This will in turn result in the creation of one or more massive
and detailed private databases (in addition to the government database) that
will cover virtually every American over the age of 16 and will contain a vast
array of information from address and picture to purchasing and lifestyle
habits. Consistent with current practice, federal and state agencies will buy
access to these private databases, giving government entities easy access to

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

H.R. 418, 109th Cong. §§ 1, 202 (2005); see also H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202 (2005).
H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 202(b); H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(b).
See H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(d)(12).
RFID is an acronym for “radio frequency identification.”
H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 202(b)(9); H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(b)(9).
See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra at note 252, at 12.
See id. at 12-13.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 7.
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even more data, far more than they themselves have the statutory authority to
collect. 301
As things stand today, a national ID system promises to provide the worst
of both worlds: a system that enables surveillance of the population in general
but provides zero increased protection against terrorists. 302
C. Generalized Surveillance
The public interest in privacy should protect individuals against disclosure
by their government of personal information about them. As such, the public
interest in privacy imposes certain limits on governmental action. This
limitation on governmental power should extend as well to generalized
surveillance of the population.
Generalized and passive surveillance can be the condition of life in a
tyrannical police state, as memorably portrayed in Orwell’s 1984. 303 It can
also be merely the result of gradual desensitization in the United States, where
consumer profiling is routine, panoptical television sets are marketed as highly
desirable, and people relish the thought of being on television.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments have never been invoked against
generalized and passive surveillance of whole populations. 304 There are
criminal penalties and civil remedies for abuses of technology that have

301. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra at note 252, at 8.
302. Indeed, as currently proposed, a centralized database may do more harm than good to
innocents. The FBI published a notice on July 28, 2005, outlining plans to create a records
system that would encompass the governments terrorist “watch list” information, operational
support records, and records related to complaints or inquiries from individuals. Notice to
Establish System of Records, 70 Fed. Reg. 43715 (July 28, 2005). As envisioned, the system will
be used to make important determinations about individuals, such as whether they may fly on
airplanes, enter the United States, or be arrested. Id. The FBI proposes to exempt the system
from requirements that agencies maintain only accurate timely, complete, relevant and necessary
information about individuals, as mandated by the Privacy Act of 1974. Proposed Rule, 70 Fed.
Reg. 43661 (July 28, 2005). Under the FBI’s proposed rule, citizens would not be able to access
or correct this information, and they will have no judicially enforceable right of redress for
negative determinations made on the basis of the system. Id. The Department of Justice
Inspector General reported in June 2005 that
Our review of the consolidated watch list identified a variety of issues that contribute to
weaknesses in the completeness and accuracy of the data, including variances in the
record counts between [two versions of the database], duplicate records, missing or
inappropriate handling instructions or categories, missing records, and inconsistencies in
identifying information between [the terrorist screening database] and source records.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT DIVISION, AUDIT REPORT NO. 05-27,
REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER CHPT. 7 (June 2005).
303. See Nissenbaum, supra note 227, at 569.
304. But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment did
not support a challenge to generalized passive surveillance).
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become old-fashioned, like wiretapping. 305 However, new surveillance
technologies are far less heavy-handed, so they seem less intrusive. Further,
they can be adopted incrementally for purposes that, ostensibly at least, are
quite benign, and indeed beneficial.
One of the difficulties in mounting legal arguments against group
surveillance is the distinction in the United States between the public sector
and the private sector. The Constitution places limits only on governmental
powers. 306 Accordingly, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect against
overreaching by the state. 307 When private corporations install cameras and
“profile” consumers, few Americans perceive an assault on their rights. We
have grown accustomed to the presence of hidden cameras in banks and
convenience stores. We have adopted the habit of using surveillance as a
means for social control, to maintain order and to create a sense of safety and
security on private property. 308 One result of this desensitization is that now,
outside the confines of our own homes, our “expectation of privacy” is almost
gone.
However, as I have argued, it is wrong to assume there is a category of
information about people that is “up for grabs,” to be used by anyone for any
person. Philosopher and privacy scholar Helen Nissenbaum calls this the
problem of “privacy in public.” 309 For example, a woman was raped and badly
beaten in New York’s Central Park in 1989. The case became famous as a
racially charged example of prosecutorial misconduct. 310 Even though the rape
occurred in a public place, and the trials of the accused rapists were public
events, the victim maintained a measure of privacy as to her identity. 311 Even
in more mundane situations, moreover, there does exist a right to maintain a
measure of confidentiality in public. As Nissenbaum points out, for example,
it is within one’s rights to say “none of your business” to a stranger who asks
your name, even in a public square or sidewalk. 312
It is equally wrong to say that an aggregation of information violates no
privacy interest so long as its individual components, taken individually, reveal
305. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2005).
306. See generally U.S. CONST.
307. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
308. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra at note 252, at 1-3.
309. Nissenbaum, supra note 227, at 559.
310. A Crime Revisited: Excerpts From District Attorney’s Report on Re-examination of
Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002; Dwyer, J, Likely U-Turn by Prosecutors in Jogger Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A1; McFadden, RD, History is Shadow in Present in Jogger Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at B1; Rashbaum, WK, Convicted Killer and Rapist Says He Attacked
Central Park Jogger, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at B2.
311. The rape victim has subsequently published a book. See TRISHA MELLI, I AM THE
CENTRAL PARK JOGGER (2003).
312. Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of
Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 207, 214 (1997).
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little. George Kateb makes the case that data mining and video surveillance
erode our integrity as individuals. 313 When the world is divided between those
who watch and those who are the subject of scrutiny, the watchers are
empowered, and the people on the wrong end of the camera are stripped of
dignity:
[O]ne is insulted, and insulted deeply, because one loses all possibility of
innocence. . . . . . . . . [O]ne is crudely treated as interesting and even as
presumptively or potentially guilty, no matter how law abiding one is. . . . . . . .
One is placed under constant suspicion just by being placed under constant
watchfulness and subjected to the implicit interrogation that exists when the
accumulated information on oneself is seen as a set of integrated answers that
add up to a helpless, an unauthored autobiography. Such a loss of
innocence . . . . . . . is so massive that the insult involved constitutes an assault
on the personhood or human status of every individual. 314

The public interest in privacy recognizes that citizens are more than the
sum of the data elements they disclose to the state. Just as public surveillance
constitutes a form of tyranny, 315 there is a fundamental privacy violation when
the government permits or encourages data mining by commercial enterprises.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
To protect the public interest in privacy, the government must fulfill its
obligation to safeguard from public access the personal information with which
it has been entrusted. Until recently, open government records were difficult
to access, due to what the Supreme Court called the “practical obscurity” of
paper storage. 316 Finding information about an individual used to involve
making personal visits to local offices to locate records. Electronic formats
and Internet publication have fundamentally changed the relationship between
individuals, their information, and the government.
The assumptions
underlying these relationships deserve fresh inquiry, and new policies should
be adopted to govern these relationships. 317
A.

Open Government Records

The greatest threat to privacy comes from government in secret. The best
way to protect individual privacy is to make the government accountable to its

313. George Kateb, On Being Watched and Known, 68 SOCIAL RES. 269, 275 (2001).
314. Id. at 274-75.
315. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 135 (2004).
316. U.S. v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989).
317. For a work in progress on how to apply the principles of fair information practices to
commercial data brokers, see Daniel J. Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection (Version 1.1), GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 132, Mar. 8, 2005,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=681902.
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citizens, and open government records statutes serve this purpose. State
legislatures should draft open government records statutes to incorporate
provisions that reveal the inner workings of government and simultaneously
protect individual privacy: to that end, the following recommendations offer a
set of policies to be considered and adopted by agencies in the executive and
legislative branches of government.
i. Government Agencies Must Notify Individuals That Their Personal
Information May Be Disclosed to the Public Pursuant to Open Government
Records Requests. The first and most important recommendation is to put the
public on notice that their personal information in government records may be
disclosed. Many people are unaware that their personal information may
become public when they make disclosures for the purpose of doing business
with state and local government agencies. 318 For example, if they have an
“unlisted” telephone number, they may not expect that their addresses and
phone numbers will be disclosed pursuant to an open government records
request. All governmental agencies should provide notice that information
may be disclosed.
ii. Government Agencies Must Limit the Personal Information They Collect
from Individuals. Public agencies should only collect the data they need to
serve their statutorily mandated functions and refrain from collecting
extraneous personal information. Indeed, they should be able to identify the
purposes for which they collect each item of personal information about
individuals.
Moreover, state and local government agencies should re-examine the
information they collect from individuals to determine whether the information
is relevant and necessary to perform the agencies’ mandated functions. For
example, to collect Social Security numbers for fishing licenses may be
convenient for the agency but serve no essential governmental function; if so,
the practice should be abolished. If the personal information is not necessary
for the agencies’ mandated functions, the agencies should not collect it.
Government agencies should adopt the principles of fair information
practices. There should be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used. There should be a way
for him to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about him. If a
public agency collects personal information for one purpose, it should not use
the information for other purposes or re-disclose the information without
notice to the affected individuals.
For most categories of government records, closer study will be required to
determine whether government agencies should publish personally identifiable
information. Vital records, for example, deserve fresh scrutiny. Records of
318. Sandra Byrd Peterson, Note, Your Life as an Open Book: Has Technology Rendered
Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 163, 168-69 (1995).
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births, deaths, marriages and other vital statistics, long presumed to be public
records, are now being reconsidered in many jurisdictions, questioning whether
they are appropriate for Internet publication. 319
Licensing records similarly deserve a fresh look. Dog licenses, hunting
and fishing licenses, and many species of permit applications necessarily
collect home address information. There may be good reasons to disclose
home addresses and other particulars about applicants, but none appear at first
glance. 320 The New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs recently stopped
publishing the home addresses of licensed professionals on its web site,
although it still discloses addresses of record (including home addresses) upon
request. 321
State legislatures should consider the following factors to determine
whether personal information such as home addresses should be exempted
from government records:
- the type of record requested;
- the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure;
- the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated;
- the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure;
- the degree of need for access; and
- whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy
or other recognizable interest militating toward access. 322
iii. Public Agencies Should Program Their Computer Systems and
Applications to Collect But Not Disclose Personal Information. In the future,
most requests for government records will likely be answered in electronic
form, making computer systems and application design a technological answer
to ensuring that data items like Social Security numbers and home addresses
are not disclosed when redaction is required. As new computer systems and
applications are phased in, they should be designed to flag the data fields for
personal information and automatically redact this information when required
to respond to open government records requests.
319. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:4 (2005) (effective through Jan. 1, 2006 and
amended by H.R. 383, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2005)) (privacy requirements for vital
records); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6254 (West 2005), (exempting vital records from disclosure under
California Public Records Act).
320. Home address and telephone should ordinarily be redacted from disclosures under open
government records statutes, except in the case of title search records voter registration records,
and records where disclosure would serve the purpose of shedding light on government. This will
not foreclose the news media, professional investigators, or title search companies from obtaining
residential street addresses. In order to obtain home address information, requestors may obtain
common law access to government records.
321. See generally New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/
home.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
322. U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
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This will require the state to identify a set of data items to be redacted from
every record released to the public, such as home address, home telephone
number, and financial and medical information. In addition, they must identify
categories of records to be exempted from public disclosure, such as records
concerning minor children.
iv. Individuals Should Be Permitted to “Opt-Out” of Having Their
Personal Information Disclosed to the Public Pursuant to Open Government
Records Requests. It may be appropriate in some cases to give individuals a
means to indicate that they do not want their personal information to be
disclosed to the public. 323 For example, they should be permitted in
appropriate cases to file an “address of record” as an alternative to their home
address. In many cases government agencies collect address information from
residents not for the purpose of establishing residency but for other purposes,
such as future contact. 324 Citizens who do not want their home addresses to be
disclosed should, in appropriate cases, have the option of providing an address
of record in lieu of home address.
v. Legislatures Should Give State and Local Agencies Adequate Funding to
Comply with Requests for Government Records So As Not to Burden
Requestors or Records Custodians with the Expense of Redaction and Other
Requirements. To redact personal information such as home addresses from
paper records is very burdensome. Redaction is labor intensive, time
consuming, and costly. 325 In the future, it should be cheap and easy to
program government computers so that inappropriate personal information is
not disclosed electronically. Most requests for government records will in the
future probably ask for electronic copies of electronic records. Many current
and old records are still on paper, however, and most are archived or difficult
to access. 326 Some requests are for dozens of boxes or thousands of documents
stored at remote locations or in media that are difficult to retrieve. 327
323. In 1999, for example, Congress amended the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, changing it
from an “opt-out” law to an “opt-in” law, meaning that state departments of motor vehicles could
not sell personal data for commercial purposes without the individuals’ consent. Nevertheless,
following the June 2000 effective date of the opt-in provision, data brokers continued to purchase
millions of records from the Florida government for a penny each. The data brokers knew that
the law had changed (having lobbied against it), but Fidelity Bank, a Florida savings and loan,
bought from the Florida DMV names and addresses of individuals who had registered new or
used cars. Florida has patched its statute, and Fidelity Bank has been held liable for liquidated
damages. Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank and Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005).
324. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1142-49.
325. David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, §§ IIH, II-I (2005).
326. Solove, supra note 1, at 1139.
327. See, e.g., Courier Post v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 821 A.2d 1190, 1195-96 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (offering the following factors to be considered to determine whether
requestors should bear the costs for retrieving and inspecting government records: 1) The volume
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As a general proposition, the expense of redacting personal information
should not be borne by requestors but should instead be considered part of the
cost of providing governmental services. This proposition places a very
significant burden on governmental agencies and may be staggering for local
governments, in staff time, technical equipment, and workspace. For this
reason, every government agency should consider and articulate its reasons for
collecting and disclosing personal information and receive appropriate funding
support.
B.

Privacy and Fair Information Practices

In order to adopt statutes that will protect the public interest in individual
privacy, legislatures will have to identify categories of government records that
should be kept confidential or from which personal information should be
redacted. Some categories of government records clearly belong in the public
domain, and some categories, just as clearly, do not. Records custodians need
clear guidelines to determine whether personal information should be disclosed
from different categories of records. Fortunately, legal precedents and many
current state government resources are available to develop such guidelines. 328
i. Public Domain and Private Information. It is commonly understood that
many records are in the public domain – and should be - such as real property
records. In many cases, however, citizens give their personal information to
state and local government agencies expecting that the agencies will not give
this information to anyone else. 329 For many records, like applications for
fishing licenses and recreational softball leagues, citizens currently expect that
the government will not publish their home addresses or unlisted telephone
numbers, much less sensitive personal information.
Real property records should remain in the public domain. Generally,
public agencies should allow access to information where the information is to
be used for the purposes of facilitating the transfer of title to real property, such
as title searching, the issuance of title insurance, mortgage origination, and
other common activities related to the sale and financing of property.
Government records that contain this information include property deeds,
mortgages, municipal tax assessment records, tax liens, and judgment liens. 330

of government records involved; 2) the period of time over which the records were received by
the government unit; 3) whether some or all of the records sought are archived; 4) the amount of
time required for a government employee to locate, retrieve and assemble the documents for
inspection or copying; 5) the amount of time, if any, required to be expended by government
employees to monitor the inspection or examination; and 6) the amount of time required to return
the documents to their original storage space).
328. Solove, supra note 1, at 1162-64.
329. Id. at 1140; Peterson, supra note 321, at 168-69.
330. 329 Solove, supra note 1, at 1145.
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From other categories of records, by contrast, personal information should
routinely be withheld from public disclosure. Such categories include, for
example, records containing information about minor children and records
containing medical information, such as municipal recreation department
records. 331
ii. Definition of “Personal Information.” To distinguish between records
that properly belong in the public domain from the confidential data they
should protect in the interest of privacy, legislatures must define “personal
information” and charge records custodians with responsibility to ensure that
personal information is not released to the public. For example, the Federal
Privacy Act defines such records as
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that
contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a
photograph. 332

More simply, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
guidelines define “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified
or identifiable individual (data subject).” 333
iii. Specific Privacy Legislation. The federal government enacted the
Privacy Act as a companion to the FOIA, and the Supreme Court has

331. Judicial process will continue to be available, allowing litigants, the press, and other
interested parties to inspect records that have been closed, especially in cases that involve public
officials or public figures. Personal information that is routinely redacted would still be available
to the public through common law access to government records. A court should make such a
determination only after a public hearing of which reasonable notice has been given, and at which
any interested person has a right to be heard and to contest.
332. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (West 2004). “Personally identifying information” could similarly
be defined to mean any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in
conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual and includes, but is not
limited to, the name, address, telephone number, date of birth, social security number, official
state issued identification number, employer or taxpayer number, place of employment, employee
identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card
number, mother’s maiden name, unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or
iris image or other unique physical representation, or unique electronic identification number,
address or routing code of the individual.
333. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html;
see
also Declaration on Transborder Data Flows, OECD, Apr. 1985, http://www.oecd.org/
documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_201185_1888153_1_1_1_1,00.html. For a comparison of U.S.
privacy law to the OECD guidelines, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 771 (1999).
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interpreted the statutes together. 334 State legislatures could similarly enact
specific privacy legislation to accompany open government records statutes.
iv. Omnibus Fair Information Practices Statutes. Every state in the
European Union, Canada, and other countries have adopted fair information
practices statutes. 335 This approach is available to the United States as well.
Such statutes, at a minimum, would require all government agencies to (1)
compile an index of all databases containing personal information; (2) permit
individuals access to the non-exempt personal information collected about
them; and (3) provide individuals the opportunity to verify the accuracy of that
personal information maintained by the agency. 336
C. Courthouse Records
The public interest in privacy applies with respect to courthouse records
just as it applies to government records of the executive branch. Generally,
courthouse records fall under the aegis of state supreme courts rather than a
body of statutes. 337 Accordingly, while similar recommendations apply to
both, the proper domain for codifying rules that apply to courthouse records is
not legislation but the rules of court. The following guidelines would serve to
safeguard the public interest in individual privacy with respect to courthouse
records.
i. Redaction. The courts should redact from online records all Social
Security numbers and other personal information that could facilitate identity
theft or financial fraud. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press:
[W]e hold as a categorical matter that a third party’s request for law
enforcement records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be
expected to invade that citizen’s privacy, and that when the request seeks no
‘official information’ about a Government agency, but merely records that the
Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is ‘unwarranted.’ 338

334. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 490-91 (1994).
335. See Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21, §§ 1-2 (1985); OECD Privacy Statement
Generator (2000), http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_34255_28863271_1_1_
_1,00.html.
336. See Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21, §§ 10, 12 (1985); A few American statutes
embrace these principles, but cover narrow segments of personal information. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (1970) (Fair Credit Reporting Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974) (Privacy Act
of 1974).
337. Michael Caughey, Keeping Attorneys from Trashing Identities: Malpractice as a
Backstop Protection For Clients Under the United States Judicial Conference’s Policy on
Electronic Court Records, 79 WASH. L. REV. 407, 411 (2004).
338. 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
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ii. Limit Commercial Access to Courthouse Records. No benefit accrues to
individuals who are forced to disclose information about themselves as a result
of being hailed into court. 339 Litigants, jurors, and witnesses should be entitled
to a measure of protection, instead of having their personal information mined
for the commercial benefit of enterprises with which the individuals have no
relationship.
The courts may constitutionally require that businesses be explicit about
what they intend to do with the personal information they obtain from the
judicial branch. In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Corp., for example, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that limited
commercial access to arrest records. 340 The statute permitted public access for
scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes. 341 The Court
concluded that the government may selectively grant access to public record
information. 342 In Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, the Court stated that the
government may condition the receipt of discovery information on
nondisclosure. 343 Criminal records that merit special protection include
presentence reports, plea agreements, unexecuted warrants, and pre-indictment
documents.
iii. Security. The judiciary must adopt state-of-the-art security measures to
prevent hackers and information brokers (including the judiciary’s own
outsourcing contractors) from culling sensitive information from its electronic
files.
iv. Notice to the Public. The Rules of Court should be amended to account
for privacy and security. The courts must put litigants, witnesses, and jurors
on notice that personal information about them may be sold and/or published
worldwide on the Internet.
The rules should establish liability and
consequences for releasing restricted information, as well as remedies for
providing erroneous or incomplete information derived from court records. 344
v. Acknowledge Individuals. Privacy protection should extend to persons,
not corporations. To a limited extent, anonymity is already permitted: grand
jury secrecy protects the interests of an innocent accused, 345 and some litigants

339. For this reason, the “information bargain” does not apply to court records, or government
records of any kind. That is to say, the benefits that individuals may obtain from supermarket
discount cards, for example, do not apply to interactions with the government.
340. 528 U.S. 32, 34, 41 (1999).
341. Id. at 35.
342. Id. at 41.
343. Id.
344. The rules should also provide remedies and consequences for improperly withholding
public information.
345. See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979).
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(such as rape victims and minors) are permitted to use their initials only. 346
The principles that protect the privacy interests of individuals who must
participate in the court system should extend to electronic court records.
vi. Limit Fees. Court records should not be sold to generate revenue for
the judicial branch. In this country, personally identifiable information is
treated as a commodity, and the data-mining industry generates substantial
revenues. 347 The judiciary could easily sell court records for profit to
companies that collect information to do background checks and the like. This
would be highly inappropriate. The courts are created to serve the entire
population of the state. Their costs should not be borne exclusively by
litigants, witnesses, and others who have involuntarily come into contact with
the justice system.
Release of information on computer tape in many instances is far more
revealing than release of hard copies, and offers the potential for far more
intrusive inspections. Unlike paper records, computerized records can be
rapidly retrieved, searched, and reassembled in novel and unique ways, not
previously imagined. For example, doctors can search for medical-malpractice
claims to avoid treating litigious patients; employers can search for workerscompensation claims to avoid hiring those who have previously filed such
claims; and credit companies can search for outstanding judgments and other
financial data. Thus, the form in which information is disseminated can be a
factor in the use of and access to records. 348

CONCLUSION
Congress, state legislatures, and the judiciary must empower federal, state,
and local government agencies to protect the public interest in privacy and
thereby fulfill their constitutional and statutory obligations. State and local
government agencies should evaluate and articulate their reasons for collecting
individually identifiable information about citizens.
In some instances, government agencies need information about
individuals in order to provide services to those individuals. In such cases,
disclosures about the individuals will reveal nothing about governmental

346. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 n.2 (1989) (noting that the court would
use the rape victims initials for privacy interests); J.K. v. Kucharski, 661 N.W.2d 216 (Mich.
2003) (using a minor’s initials in a termination of parental rights case); State ex rel. T.W. v.
Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41, 42 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (using a minor’s initials in a termination of
parental rights case).
347. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1149-51.
348. Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 660 A.2d 1163, 1172 (N.J. 1995).
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operations.
Accordingly, in those instances, personally identifiable
information should not be routinely disclosed. 349
The public interest in privacy similarly attaches to court records. The
judiciary should not yield to the demands of profit or even of tradition without
a fresh evaluation of its obligation to protect the personal information it has
obtained from individuals who are under compulsion to the system.

349. In other cases, the information may be gathered for the purpose of evaluating
governmental operations, and disclosure would be appropriate. See U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
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